Editor’s Note: Wikistrat’s Facebook followers recently engaged in a 24-hour exclusive Q&A drill with one of Wikistrat’s Senior Analysts — Daniel Kaszeta.

Daniel Kaszeta is a Wikistrat Senior Analyst and an independent security and antiterrorism consultant currently located in London. He is a former US Army Chemical Corps officer as well as a former member of various US government agencies, including the US Secret Service. Mr. Kaszeta has 22 years of experience in numerous aspects of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense. He is an occasional contributor to CBRNe World magazine as well as several other publications. His book “CBRN and Hazmat Incidents at Major Public Events: Planning and Response” was published in November 2012.

Graham O’Brien: I was wondering what your opinion would be on the idea of introducing an active counter-proliferation plan in Syria.

Answer: Generally, I would take the term “active counterproliferation” to mean use of dynamic means and active measures, such as armed force, to control, capture, or eliminate Syria’s presumed chemical (and possibly biological) arsenal. My opinion is that successful “active counterproliferation” will be very difficult to achieve in the current situation in Syria, for a variety of reasons. I have the following specific concerns:

1. Attribution: Before acting, I’d want to be pretty certain I was acting against the correct party. Who did what to whom with chemical weapons? We must remember that the use of chemical weapons has been portrayed as a red line in this conflict, and one party to the conflict will have much to gain by successfully convincing the world that the other party used a prohibited weapon. Indeed, the tactical advantages of chemical weapons in this kind of environment may be marginal, so one could argue that there’s more to gain from framing the opponent than from using it one’s self.
2. Intelligence: Where are the weapons? In an arsenal? In a secured laboratory? Dispersed among the troops already? Excellent intelligence on the location of the weapons is required. Pretty good information on local weather conditions will be needed to avoid some pretty horrific collateral damage. Good intelligence on how the weapons are protected will be needed.
3. Dispersal: If chemical ordnance has been used, then at least some subset of the chemical weapons inventory has been dispersed from depots/arsenals down to military units who are using the weapons or have them ready for use. Targeting a handful of depots based on satellite imagery is a relatively simple task. Targeting every single field artillery battery in the Syrian Army may be too hard to do. In such a case, “active counterproliferation” is probably impossible.
4. Targeting: Knowing in general terms where special weapons may be stored is one thing; having enough data to allow for precise targeting is another thing indeed.
5. Collateral Damage: There’s a great deal of uncertainty as to how much collateral damage may happen from a strike on a depot. Contrary to some wishful thinking I’ve seen online, large conventional explosions don’t necessarily burn up chemical or biological weapons. A strike has every possibility of causing injury or death in a downwind hazard zone. Even under optimum conditions with very good modern precision ordnance, there is no way to rule out collateral damage from such a strike. Innocent people may be harmed.
6. Getting drawn into the ground war: The use of airmobile or airborne forces to attempt to seize chemical/biological weapons would require rather a lot of forces and would amount to an entry into the ground war.
7. Unintended Proliferation: Would an active counterproliferation measure, like a raid or an airstrike have the unintended consequence of proliferation? As one example, an airstrike may only destroy part of the inventory of chemical weapons in a particular depot, yet completely obliterate the security measures at the site, leaving the undestroyed inventory open to theft by insurgents.
8. Legal Ramifications: If the US, Israel, NATO, etc. were to conduct some sort of strike on a chemical weapons storage site and civilians were killed or injured downwind of the site, is this, in effect, the same under international law, as a chemical attack? If civilians are killed by a nerve agent that was released only because of US bombing, is that then a war a crime?

For all of these reasons, I think that “active counterproliferation measures” are troublesome and don’t really work in Syria as an option, other than as part of a full military intervention. They might even make things worse.

Natasha Tereshchenko: What, if anything, do you recommend external players, such as the US, do about the alleged chemical weapons use in Syria?

Answer: The problem can be distilled into three components: verification, attribution, and reaction.

Verification: The West must verify what has actually happened. Have chemical weapons actually been used? The existing evidence to date is interesting but not exactly compelling. Available evidence seems to be misguiding, tainted, questionable, and/or vague. I will not attempt to repeat the excellent analysis done by the “Brown Moses” blog or my colleague Steve Johnson at CBRNe World magazine (see page 16 here).

There seems to be a lack of “smoking gun” evidence so far. Or if it does exist, it is still locked away in the depths of the world’s intelligence agencies. To simplify an entire field of chemical warfare forensics… we haven’t seen evidence that would ever hold up in court. If someone has died from nerve, blood, blister, or choking agents, a proper autopsy, conducted forensically, can tell us what happened. Nerve agents will leave an imbalance of acetylcholine and acetylcholinesterase, enzymes that enables the function of the nervous system and the mechanism by which nerve agents kill their victims. Someone killed by blister agents (mustard or lewisite) will have serious and obvious damage to their respiratory tract. Blood agents (cyanides) may be a bit more discrete, but competent toxicology will determine the presence of cyanides in a dead body. Choking agents (phosgene) will kill by pulmonary edema, which can be determined by autopsy. Granted, Islam calls for rapid burial of the dead, so not every corpse would be available for analysis. But if people have been killed by chemical warfare agents, where are the bodies?

Many chemical weapons are non-persistent (sarin and the cyanides), but many others are persistent and will last a long time in the environment. Where is the residue? If chemical weapons have been used, somebody somewhere should come up with a sample of liquid, vapor, contaminated soil, or a swab from human skin. Where is the sample? Likewise, chemical warfare requires the means of dissemination. Bombs, bomblets, artillery shells, spray tanks, rockets, missile warheads, mines, and similar devices have been historically used for dissemination of chemical weapons. There are some videos and photos of possible devices (some certainly flawed if you look at the article and blog cited above). But does someone somewhere have a device we can look at? A fragment of a device? Chemical munitions leave residue, almost by definition. If you use enough explosive bursting agent to completely destroy the munition into uncollectable fragments, it is not the optimum means of dispersal. Believe me, I’m a former Chemical Corps officer. Chemical shells “pop” rather than “bang”. Where are the shell fragments and empty bomblets?

Attribution: There is a serious issue of who is doing what to whom. The fog of war is very thick in Syria. It is no longer a simple matter of uniformed regulars versus improvised insurgents. Many uniformed combatants from the Syrian army have defected, and the Assad regime is using a variety of irregulars that could appear very much like the insurgents they are combating. Because the use of CBRN weapons carries great moral opprobrium and has been declared a “red line” by the West, there may be great strategic gains to be made by smearing the other side with accusations. Indeed, the strategic value of getting world opinion on your side may be much higher than the tactical value of using chemical weapons in battle. Getting someone to foam from the mouth on video is a cheap Hollywood parlor trick, but if it convinces the world’s media that nerve agents have been used by your enemy, it might be worth it to one side or the other.

Reaction: As far as what to actually do in Syria? First of all, many of the issues involved in this complex problem are alluded to in the answer to the previous question. I think that active intervention measures, such as airstrikes or attempts to seize control by means of special operations forces, are fraught with liabilities. I think that, perhaps, the best intervention is passive defense. We should provide the insurgents with protective masks, gloves, suits, boots, and nerve agent antidotes. We should provide chemical defense training, possible in camps in Turkey or Jordan. Most importantly, we need to provide a lot of plastic bags (and correct procedures) to take samples. We need people to bring us the soil samples and shell fragments.

Jesse Parent: What are the major challenges for non-proliferation of CBRN faced by the world today?

Answer: CBRN non-proliferation is a difficult field and a full survey of the challenges would fill a lengthy book, so I will focus my answer on what I think the most difficult challenges are. From my perspective, the biggest challenges are in the area of chemical and biological non-proliferation. Specifically, my biggest concerns are ease of entry and detection.

Ease of Entry: If a country wants to develop nuclear weapons technology, the barriers to entry are high. Not only is there a requirement for fissile material, the infrastructure and labor needed to develop a nuclear weapon, let alone one useful in a warhead, is vast. It takes billions of dollars, large facilities (which are distinctive and hard to hide), specialty equipment (procurement of which may be hard to camouflage), and hundreds or even thousands of scientists and engineers (some of whom will be targeted by intelligence services of other countries).

The problem with biological and chemical weapons is that the level of effort is lower. It takes fewer people with expertise, less exotic ingredients, generic facilities, and more mundane equipment (and equipment that is either ubiquitous or easily manufactured). We should not forget that chlorine gas and phosgene are technologies that are over a hundred years old and are widespread in modern industry. Mustard gas and Lewisite date from the end of the First World War. Nerve agents are the cutting edge of 1930s technology. Strategic-level mass production of anthrax dates from the late 1940s.

Detection: Because of the lower barriers to entry in the chemical and biological arena, detection is much more difficult. Many available intelligence collection techniques simply cannot see through walls, into a petri dish, or into the distillation column of an otherwise mundane-looking laboratory or factory. There are simply fewer tools at the disposal of the intelligence and diplomatic agencies to figure out if someone is hiding CW or BW development.

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EDITOR’S NOTE: Wikistrat recently concluded a geostrategic simulation titled “Korean Conflict Pathways”. This crowdsourced simulation strategized how escalation dynamics on the Korean peninsula might just trigger an East Asian war that nobody wants but seemingly everyone is planning for. Thus, the goal here was not simply to reimagine the Korean conflict in light of Kim Jong-Un’s recent provocations, but to contextualize that development within larger regional trends.

One entry, named “DPRK Triggers East Asian Cyber War”, explored the possibility of conflict dynamics leading to a cyber war between major powers in the region.

Unsure of the U.S. threats of retaliation, Kim Jong-un orders a cyber attack against ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) in an attempt to determine what retaliatory response might come from the United States. Both the United States and the ROK are quick to blame the DPRK for the cyber attack. The President of the United States, Korea Command and the ROK CJCS react swiftly. U.S. intelligence agencies launch a joint attack against critical North Korean infrastructure and disrupt the electronic guidance systems of North Korean missiles (critically escalating the situation). The attack quickly spirals out of control and external stakeholders are recruited to contain the crisis.

Cyber raids are the DPRK’s most-often used asymmetric tactic against its opponents’ infrastructures, because of its inexpensive implementation and relatively low risk of increased sanctions/condemnation by the international community. The DPRK and its proxies strike hard with a joint-attack against the CFC’s network and South Korean financial institutions. The attacks momentarily paralyze CFC’s C⁴I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) and the South Korean economy.

The ROK Government is unsure how to respond. Since North Korea uses proxy forces for its cyber attacks, the ROK is unable to target directly the original perpetrators In North Korea. The ROK, together with U.S. intelligence agencies, strike back at critical North Korean military infrastructure. To make sure North Korea understands that they mean business, the combined effort expands to target North Korea’s deployed missiles. Using a variation of the infamous Stuxnet virus, U.S. intelligence agencies deploy the virus to shut down targeting systems within the missiles and create momentary havoc at the North Korean missile operation centers.

The United States publicly blames the DPRK for wreaking cyber havoc on CFC and the ROK. However, it might paradoxically increase the likelihood of the United States “paying” concessions because of its eagerness to avoid a kinetic conflict.  A big question mark is the actions of independent hacking groups like Anonymous, which could unwittingly escalate the conflict if word were to get out and a mass distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack were attempted. U.S. Cyber Command, in tandem with other U.S. intelligence agencies and their ROK counterparts, explores pathways through which it can wreak havoc on the DPRK’s cyber capabilities.

Purposeful escalation by Kim Jong-un leads to concessions being paid to avoid a larger conflict after the United States and ROK inflict damage on the DPRK’s grid and computer networks. But at the same time, the DPRK’s cyber attacks will have triggered a cyber arms race across the Pacific, whereby state actors cultivate their own corps of hackers to undercut each other’s soft and hard power.

Once China and the United States come to a mutual understanding regarding the source and the origin of the cyber attack on CFC’s C⁴I and on the Bank of Korea, they diplomatically pressure the DPRK to end its cyber campaigns to avoid escalation. However, residual suspicions between the United States and China may still prompt both countries to beef up cyber defense/offense against each other. Both China and the United States might remain forever suspicious of each other’s motives.

Wikistrat Analysts Brian C. Chao, Daniel Moore, Jeong Lee, James McGirk and Roger Cavazos contributed to this scenario.

Editor’s Note: Wikistrat’s latest community-wide simulation, “Britain Exits the European Union”, has just launched and will run from May 20th until May 30th, 2013.

As continental Europe remains embroiled in the euro-crisis, British doubts about its future in the European Union have increased. Pressured by Eurosceptic members of his ruling party and the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party on the right, Prime Minister David Cameron has announced an “in-out” referendum on the island nation’s EU membership after the 2015 election — by which time he hopes to have achieved ample treaty changes that will allow Britain to opt out of far-reaching European economic and fiscal integration plans and convince British voters that their future is still in the EU.

Cameron’s gamble might not pay off, however. “Other countries are tiring of British demands,”wrote The Economist in December. Germany prefers to avoid a British exit as it could tilt the balance of power in Europe in favor of the Mediterranean member states, but is not prepared to concede much in the way of social and labor-market regulation. The French reject an “a la carte Europe” and maybe even would rather Britain leaves for the very reason Germany fears it.

In this Simulation Wikistrat invites its community of strategists to explore scenario pathways for Britain exiting the EU. Wikistrat analysts will describe the reasons why Britain might exit the European Union, explore the strategy chosen by Britain and the economic, political and security implications of such an event for both the EU and the United Kingdom.

Want to participate? Apply for membership to the analytic community here.

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EDITOR’S NOTE: Wikistrat recently concluded a geostrategic simulation titled “Who 3D Prints What in 2033?”. This crowdsourced simulation generated competing scenarios of which products will lead the way and prove to be the most decisive in reshaping their industry sector via 3D printing.

One entry, named “Adidas, Nike, et al. Print Millions of Custom Sneakers (Profitably)”, forecasted shoes – particularly brand name athletic shoes – as a viable item for 3D printing in the next two decades.

Currently, brand name athletic shoes face uncertain demand, yet have a long production cycle and require large order quantities every season. By 2033, additive manufacturing based on user specifications and customization eliminates demand uncertainty, reduces order volume, and shortens the production cycle dramatically.

The shoe production process currently requires months to years. It involves making educated guesses about what will sell next season, designing shoes based on these forecasts, producing samples to test for fit and consumer acceptability, manufacturing those large quantities based upon their best guesses, then shipping them from factories to stores, with the hope that most sell before next season. If the shoes don’t sell, many will be considered obsolete and severely discounted in order to clear the way for next season’s batch. Six- to twelve-month lead times are not uncommon in the footwear industry.

3D printing has the potential to cut those lead times significantly, while at the same time dramatically improving demand forecasts.

It also may reduce costs because there is no overproduction of designs that aren’t selling or underproduction and stockouts of fast-selling designs. There is thus a much closer balance of supply with demand. 3D printing cuts months or years from the production cycle and saves millions of dollars incurred by ordering units based on inaccurate – but currently necessary – designer forecasts.

The supply chain for 3D printed shoes may well look similar to how it is today. The major difference will be in shorter lead times and increased confidence in demand. This is made possible by a factory centered around 3D printing and tied into the designer’s online system, in which a customer selects from a design template online, customizes to his or her preferences, and orders.

Materials sourcing and process automation will primarily drive time savings. While the designs will be varied, the raw material inputs will be fairly homogenous throughout the company (dyes and composite material). Setup time for machines for custom molds is dramatically cut because of the additive manufacturing process.

Sourcing the required amount of material needed for 3D printers may prove challenging (and costly) if manufacturer’s company is using the same source material.

In this scenario, the intellectual property becomes the product. Adding more design templates will increase in importance for the shoe manufacturer – with some level of customization potentially even “outsourced” directly to the consumer; the sourcing process is likely made simpler, but perhaps more competitive.

The design of a manufacturing process that suits the preeminence of IP and customer choice is crucial. A shortened chain of communication between the designer, customer and manufacturer makes a well-functioning IT process critical. Additive manufacturing has the potential to reduce significantly the amount of labor required in the production of shoes.

Economic Impact

For most customers, the economic impact of 3D printing is positive. The variety of available products customized to tighter specifications will increase, while the cost for customization decreases. But for customers in the U.S. and abroad who depend on heavily discounted shoes at outlet malls and discount stores, the impact is largely negative. These customers currently rely on discounted excess supply that is being liquidated because it didn’t sell. For these customers, shoe costs will rise, as there are fewer cheap shoes available.

For the designer, the investment in necessary technology and infrastructure pays out because earnings will increase, as a result of lower production costs (associated with no obsolete inventory and no mass rush orders).

Manufacturers will face increased pressure from customers and retailers to adapt in order to retain business. They will have to make upfront investments in IT in order to fulfill customized orders from end users via the designer’s online presence. Labor costs become less of a factor as the process – from setup to production – becomes increasingly automated.

For textile laborers, the impact is bad. Many of them will lose their jobs as hand-sewing becomes irrelevant, in the same way robotics has replaced many hand-welding and assembly jobs.

For commodities producers and their respective countries, it depends on the raw material inputs. Textile producing countries like China and the U.S. will suffer as demand for their textiles falls. On the other hand, the associated benefits paid out to the textile industry would likely be less than the cost of subsidizing the cotton industry, but not nearly as labor intensive as other areas. However, those textile producers that are relatively less labor intensive should see fewer problems with the resulting unemployment.

Impacts on Security

If the raw materials used to produce shoes in 3D printers are the same as in other industries, the supply of the underlying commodities may face a concentration risk and increased competition. While it will fall short of a “resource war,” geopolitical competition may increase.

If countries that produce textiles in a labor-intensive fashion are not able to offset this unemployment with other production, rising unemployment may create problems with state welfare obligations and, potentially, internal unrest.

Impacts on the Environment

The environmental impact is generally positive. Fewer resources are being consumed to produce items that don’t sell. Additionally, many factories will clothes and if they are replaced by 3D printers who can produce the same items with fewer emissions, this is also a positive for the environment.

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To this end, Wikistrat analysts recommended a focus on closing choke points that drug cartels use as routes for transport and other purposes.

In this policy option, rather than seeking to win a nationwide conflict with the cartels, the government initially concentrates on “fighting smart” by identifying key choke points and closing them to the traffickers. The cartels are embroiled in a turf war over north-south transit corridors between South America (especially Colombia) and the United States. While some drugs are produced in Mexico itself, most cocaine is merely shipped through the country on its way north.

Mexican security forces are concentrated at the narrowest stretch of land (about 100 miles coast to coast), which lies across the Mexican states of Oaxaca and Veracruz. Meanwhile, the Mexican Navy cooperates with U.S. government agencies to control north-south sea lines of communications.

This could effectively choke land-based north-south drug transit. In addition, it may draw the cartels to a single front to combat government troops, freeing up the rest of the country for the authorities to reassert control.

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Wikistrat is always looking for both seasoned and up-and-coming geopolitical analysts to join the network.

There are hundreds of opportunities to contribute analysis to Wikistrat. In Wikistrat’s analytic network, work results in points and other recognition that both allow analysts to participate in higher-earning engagements. Work will be read by clients ranging from corporations to governments to NGOs, and analysts will also gain the experience of working with some of the top geopolitical minds from all around the world.

Some of our recent simulations have included:

• New Pope, New Challenges: What challenges will Pope Francis I face during his tenure, and how might he effectively address them?
• The First Woman To…: What influential positions/deeds will be held/conducted by a woman in the future? How this will impact the future geopolitical landscape?
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• Iraq in the Year 2023: What are Iraq’s possible geostrategic paths for the next decade?
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EDITOR’S NOTE: Wikistrat recently concluded a geostrategic simulation titled “Jobs of the Future”. This crowdsourced simulation outlined the jobs of tomorrow by building the case – step by step – for their logical emergence in response to socio-economic trends and/or technological advances. The purpose here was to capture and analyze a shifting job landscape.

One particularly intriguing job of the future was that of Carbon Capture and Storage Manager.

Mitigating the effects of climate change requires removal of many of the byproducts of burning fossil fuels. New technologies coming online indicate a rapid expansion of work in this field, requiring new jobs for people who are skilled at restoring the atmosphere to levels that mitigate the harshest effects of climate change.

The most promising example of atmospheric restoration is Carbon Capture and Storage. This technology is emerging but has not yet been mass produced. In this process, the CO₂ captured through the CCS process is liquefied, and could be used in a variety of different ways. Presently, the main prospected use for the liquefied carbon is in the form of EOR (Enhanced Oil Recovery), but researchers are maintaining that it could become itself a form of fuel for jets and cars, and that it could have ramifications in agricultural with the enhancement of crop production.

The ample possible uses of liquefied CO₂ make it economically interesting, both privately and publicly, and could help reduce the costs of the technology once past the R&D phase. But liquefied CO₂ does not only have commercial implications. Rather, it could become part of an international carbon-trading market, utilizing the same principles as the Kyoto Protocol. Countries could thus ameliorate their environment, or participate in the commerce of their quotas, so that CCS could even become a way for the more heavily industrialized countries to enlarge their cap. Furthermore, there are numerous other forms of recycling the CO₂, such as transforming it into methanol or splicing it into hydrogen ions and oxygen gas to create hydrocarbons.

The industries involved are multiple, as is the need for this kind of field. From a social standpoint, CO₂ contributes to the greenhouse effect, and so to keep atmospheric gases in balance, carbon could be removed or added as a necessary means to keep environmental balance.

On an economic level, the oil industry is already developing its use in EOR. EOR currently boosts U.S, oil output by 10 percent a year. Presently, CO₂ has to be shipped via pipeline, and the single largest deterrent to expanding production from EOR today is the lack of large volumes of reliable and affordable CO₂. The U.S. government estimates that state-of-the-art EOR with CCS technology could add 89 billion barrels of oil to the nation’s recoverable oil resources (four times the country’s reserves). Dr. Chichilnisky (lead author of the Nobel Prize-winning 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) predicts that the EOR market will rise to over $800 billion over the course of the next decade, creating a hugely enhanced demand for captured CO₂.

But a great many other industries could be involved. If liquefied carbon could be used as a fuel (when combined with hydrogen – or a biofuel when possibly combined with a specific algae), then it would actually replace the oil industry completely. Not only that, but the costs could be drastically reduced, because the fuel could be produced directly in the gas station (eliminating the cost of extraction – refinement – transportation). The end of fossil fuel combustion could also account for a reduction of Nitrous Oxide (N₂O), another of the primary contributors to the greenhouse effect.

The storage of the carbon itself has to be done in safe and stable manner, because otherwise we run the risk of extracting too much of it (again leading to negative impacts on the environment). The industry will require active managers who understand the science behind the capture and storage process, with an understanding of environmental requirements and engineering, so as to maintain the proper balance and safety. This will be someone with the diplomatic ability to balance stakeholders and scientific requirements.

Whilst there could very well be private firms involved in the capture, liquefaction and storage process, the overall management and overseeing of the utilization of the CO₂ would be subjected to an extremely intricate regulatory system. There would have to be legislations pertaining to the amount of capture done in each location, as well as regionally to ensure safety and to prevent explosive disruptions. Governments, as well as international organizations (UN, EU, etc.), would all set up a series of supervising bodies to serve as “watchdogs” to ensure that the prescribed limitations are not exceeded.

In this respect, a carrot and stick approach should be utilized. The carrot of profiting from CCS technologies by means of fiscal detractions and right of first refusal in government tenders, together with the stick of penalties and fines for companies that do not comply.

The job would be that of Carbon Capture and Storage Manager (CCSM). Each CCS Facility would necessitate one. Likewise, each city could have a CCS commission headed by a CCSM to ensure industry compliance to CCS regulation. Furthermore, there could be a CCSM within urban planning, that could combine the aesthetics of city planning with the even placement of synthetic trees, to allow for the carbon capture to occur in all neighborhoods and yet create pleasurable “parks” and line boulevards.

Job responsibilities would be:

• To oversee the safe capture and liquefaction process.
• To allocate the liquid carbon in the case of distribution.
• To be accountable for the safe storage and maintenance of the carbon cases, until needed, in the case of future release back into the atmosphere.
• Management during the entire life cycle of the project from commencement to completion, not to mention risk assessment.
• To interact with and balance stakeholders’ interests with scientific requirements.

Wikistrat Analysts Allegra Baistrocchi, Jeffrey Itell, James McGirk, Larry White, Lorenzo Nannetti and T Michael Lutas contributed to this scenario.

By Bijan R. Kian

Diplomacy works when opposing sides recognize that the cost of continuing conflict exceeds the benefits of a settlement. A net benefit, even a small one makes diplomacy a winner. For IRGC, the Revolutionary Guard in the Islamic Republic, such net benefit is very hard to find when it comes to normalizing relations with Washington. IRGC stands to lose the most if Washington and Tehran kiss and make up after thirty four years of sanctions and no diplomatic relations. IRGC controls the lion’s share of Iran’s economy. They are in no hurry to signal their support for turning back the nuclear clock. After the street uprisings in the summer of 2009, the supreme leader still calls the shots but only after very careful coordination with IRGC. He knows that backing down from his hard line will be frowned upon by IRGC. Any such move will signal his betrayal of IRGC. He knows he has little chance of survival without IRGC’s support.

On the other hand, to the Iranian people, Iran’s neighbors, and the world, the cost of confronting the threat of the terrorist-sponsoring, nuclear armed Islamic Republic will only rise with time and sanctions alone will not stop Iran’s nuclear machine.

International sanctions are designed to force Iran to limit its nuclear development to civilian use. However, a gradually harsher regime of sanctions has done little to change Iran’s behavior in this regard. Granted, life has become increasingly difficult for the government in Tehran. Oil revenues make up about 70% of the government’s income, and oil exports have dropped from 2.5 million bpd in 2011 to 1.25 million bpd in 2012. For Tehran, this is, of course, pure pain but Tehran’s threshold for pain has grown steadily with the tightening of the sanctions’ noose.

So, with this deplorable economic outlook, why isn’t anyone forecasting imminent demise of the Islamic Republic as an Institution? Well, while sanctions have made life difficult for the Islamic Republic, they have also created unintended consequences that favor its chances of survival. A depreciated Rial may have created a competitive advantage for non-oil exports, which have reportedly jumped up 20% in recent months. It is conceivable that sanctions have actually helped Iran diversify its economy.

Some Iran experts argue that free trade is the key to softening the hard line of the clerical regime. These experts claim that free trade can lead to gradual decline of IRGC’s threatening dominance in the country and the region. They claim that with fading of IRGC’s powers, the Quds Force will disappear and this will cut down the dangerous presence of IRGC around the world. The experts add that free trade and resumption of relations between Tehran and Washington will gradually result in shortening the life of the tyrannical regime, and that, engagement is the best way to transform the Islamic Republic from an enemy to an ally.

I could agree with this view as a plausible theory. Except for one big problem. The IRGC would agree with it too and that is precisely why they won’t buy it! It is not logical for IRGC to participate in the design and execution of a plan for its own demise.

One would reasonably ask the question: if military options are not the most desirable and sanctions don’t work, is there a viable third option?

The answer is in partnering with the Iranian people. To enact this option, a smart new strategy is needed. Such smart strategy requires a correction in Washington’s understanding of the nature of the Islamic Republic. Washington needs to understand that the Islamic Republic is powered by Islam and the nature of Islam does not permit reform. Washington needs to change its calculus and launch a new campaign to reach out to the Iranian people.

This is not an argument against diplomacy. In fact, it is an argument in favor of public diplomacy. The very nature of the Islamic Republic as an institution makes it difficult, if not impossible for it to become a full member of the international community. The system is not configured to fit the international trade and security requirements. The Islamic Republic, especially its centers of power, cannot afford to subscribe to the rules of the free world. That would mean, amongst other requirements, dropping support for terrorism worldwide and compliance with laws such as the United Kingdom Bribery Act or the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of the United States. IRGC will have to give up their ways of doing business and with that, surrender the control of the Iranian economy.

With such requirements, it is inconceivable for the Islamic Republic leaders to consider normalizing relations with Washington without alienating IRGC. IRGC simply cannot provide their consent to such surrender. They might as well commit suicide.

We have another window of opportunity. Tehran is preparing the stage for its next Kabuki dance, Iranian style – also known as the Islamic Republic elections! In this game, supreme leader, council of experts, council of guardians, expediency council and even Ahmadinejad and his hopeful successor, Esfandiar Rahim Mashai are all competing to win IRGC’s heart. The winner of the game will be the one who poses the least risk to the continuity of the Guardsmen’s powers. The winner will also be the one who offers the most to IRGC for the protection they provide. The Iranian people know this. They know that no matter who wins the game, the loss will be theirs. This gives Washington another chance to side with the people of Iran. Four years ago, the brave young Iranians came to the streets holding signs that spelled out in clear English their disgust with the tyranny of their government. Washington ignored their call for sympathy when it mattered most. We now have another chance to send a strong message to the Iranian people, their leaders and even the Revolutionary Guard to side with the Iranian people. The Iranians need to hear that we believe in their right to take back their stolen freedoms. To their leaders, we must make it very clear that we will not settle for a grand bargain with an empty promise on their part of stopping their menacing nuclear machine. We should leave no doubt in their minds that we will not partner with them to terrorize their own people, Iran’s neighbors and the world. Their Quds Force shall not be permitted to roam around the world feeding their terror machine. We should also be clear in our message that they shall not be permitted to take over Syria after Assad’s fall. Iran is the lifeline of Hezbollah through Syria. Without Syria, the business lines between Iran and Hezbollah will be disrupted. The IRGC needs to hear that their corrupt business practices will not be kept secret for too long. The people of Iran will blow their dirty covers and expose them. Their best chance for survival lies in keeping their honor and turning their loyalty to the people of Iran. They need to hear that they are better off in shifting their protection powers to the territorial integrity of Iran and away from the individuals whose powers won’t last. They need to hear that religion needs no protection. Iranian population throughout the country including those who live in villages far away from the crowded cities need to hear that an assault on the tyranny of the regime in Tehran is not an assault on Islam.

The least we can do is to stand firm on our own principles. The Iranian people will find their own way to end the Islamic Republic’s rule of tyranny. The United States cannot find a stronger ally than the Iranian people in confronting this terrorizing regime. Protectors will join the protestors if they see them as likely winners. Political decisions are made by IRGC in Iran. There is little net benefit for IRGC to support normal relations with the U.S. and Washington should cut its losses and actively engage with the people of Iran. They are our best allies. Siding with the people of Iran will make a new, free Iran the best friend of the United States. Leaving them alone in their fight raises our cost of international security.

About the Author

Bijan R. Kian is a former member of the board of directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States and a former member of the White House Business Council. He is also a former director of Foreign Investment for the State of California. Twice confirmed by the Senate of the United States, he served both Republican and Democratic presidents from 2006 to 2011.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.

EDITOR’S NOTE: Wikistrat recently concluded a geostrategic simulation titled “Korean Conflict Pathways”. This crowdsourced simulation strategized how escalation dynamics on the Korean peninsula might just trigger an East Asian war that nobody wants but seemingly everyone is planning for. Thus, the goal here was not simply to reimagine the Korean conflict in light of Kim Jong-Un’s recent provocations, but to contextualize that development within larger regional trends.

One entry, named “Regional Economic Warfare”, forecasted East Asia’s fractious international relationships boiling over into the first regional economic war.

Kim Jong-Un becomes the economic hitman of the Korean Peninsula and the East Asian periphery, minus China. The DPRK balances out threats of outright nuclear eradication with missile tests, nuclear tests and attacks or near-misses on commercial aviation and maritime activities within the DPRK’s firing range. This ratcheting up of Pyongyang’s rhetoric and behavior is specifically aimed at disrupting the functioning of the South Korean and Japanese economies and thereby discouraging foreign investment therein. North Korea even launches cyber-attacks on South Korean financial institutions, causing significant disruptions to the economy.

China indirectly becomes the beneficiary of this strategy. They decide to change their attitude and support the DPRK’s policy, foreseeing incoming opportunities from the results.

Internally, Kim’s strategy – which allows him to portray himself as defying the U.S. and its allies – consolidates his standing within the North Korea.

South Korea is forced by circumstances to hold its position and strengthen economic and civil resilience. Seoul recognizes that if it opened conventional hostilities first, China could jump in with the full weight of its armed forces. Full-scale war would likely cause more damage to the country’s industrial and financial sectors than Kim’s campaign of sabotage and pressure.

Given these factors, South Korea pushes its “big brother”, the U.S., to get in to solve a problem they cannot handle on their own. Putting pressure on China indirectly through Burma – China’s neighbor now in the flux of democratization and arguably heading to the U.S. sphere of influence – is South Korea’s best shot at influencing the PRC.

After the economic conflict, both the U.S. and China make out well as Korea and Japan suffer a crippling blow from Kim Jong-Un. Due to the collapse of the East Asian markets (minus China), many controlling stock ownerships of previously Korean and Japanese companies are now in the hands of U.S. and Chinese investors and entrepreneurs. The U.S. financial industry logs record profits for the quarter. China likewise enjoys a resurgence in manufacturing, and GDP beats expectations. There is a thought that all is well in the world minus an isolated madman fomenting a conflict out in East Asia, away from China and the United States.

The confrontation is not full scale, but limited to the economic realms where the two share converging interests after the dust settles after the flurry of change of ownership.

Notably, China has a very large influence over much of Japan after the crash in the Nikkei and the breakdown of the keiretsu system that previously shielded Japan from exactly this kind of calamity. Although a true conventional war does not erupt, the economic consequences for Tokyo are not far from what a conventional war may have created. With many of its corporations in foreign hands, Japan takes proactive decisions to reclaim them, in addition to working with the U.S. to make sure that it is Americans that hold the most foreign influence in these companies’ controlling shares. Japan also makes a contrived effort to wash out any North Korean foreign investment by creating laws that null and void any North Korean proxy ownership of a Japanese corporation.

Economic warfare inflicts no direct loss of life. This makes this kind of war more acceptable for public opinion; therefore, all of the stakeholders decide to accept the new rules of the game. But such rules are still not clear. The boundaries of the conflict are not fully shaped and some of the actions may lead to virulent domino effects.

On one hand, this kind of war has no large budgetary impact, because there is no need to finance extensive military operations. On the other, if a war like this went on for a long time, the economic damage may be similar to that of an armed conflict. Because of this, global economic interdependence forces countries that are otherwise reluctant or unwilling to participate in the hostilities to pick sides.

Wikistrat Analysts Simon Mills, Marco Giulio Barone, Alex Crowther, András Tóth-Czifra, Kieth Hilden and Nuno Felix contributed to this scenario.

Editor’s Note: Wikistrat’s latest community-wide simulation, “Who 3D Prints What in 2033?”, has just launched and will run from May 6th until May 16th, 2013.

3D printing grows more real and available to early adopters by the day, and there’s every indication that it will change the consumer goods industry across the board.  Things you’ve long bought at a big-box store or online, you’ll someday print at home, recasting the entire concept of shopping, retailing, supply chains – even manufacturing. Still, 3D printing isn’t the same thing as the “Star Trek” replicator. You’ll still need to feed your printer (which you’ll still have to buy) with various substances/materials, and then there’s the question of how you get hands on designs – the software. What’s clear is that a lot of what used to be physical transactions will be rendered virtual, just like we’ve seen with digital music.

In this simulation, Wikistrat asks its strategic community to generate competing scenarios of which products will lead the way and prove to be the most decisive in reshaping their industry sector.

Want to participate? Apply for membership to the analytic community here.

Stay tuned to Wikistrat’s Facebook and Twitter channels for updates and insights from this simulation!