Middle East Monitor March 2011

The U.N.-authorized intervention in Libya appears to have monopolized the attention of the world media, but the Middle East is a region in flux undergoing rapid changes. As stated in the previous bulletins, the region is a significantly different place with each passing month. The sparking of an uprising in Syria is equally as important as the conflict in Libya, if not more so. The Yemeni government teeters on the edge of conflict and the Saudi and possible Iranian intervention in Bahrain are defining moments in the Arab Spring, as the revolutions are increasingly referred to.

The conflicts in the Middle East were largely internal in nature until March, as this month saw the entry of foreign intervention in several places. Libya is the most obvious example, with a U.N.-backed coalition (and possibly Al-Qaeda) backing the rebels and Muammar Qaddafi being supported by Syria, Belarus and possibly Algeria and others. Saudi and Emirati forces entered Bahrain to support the Royal Family and Iranian ayatollahs are reportedly registering volunteers to wage war on the Bahraini government. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have also begun launching attacks on Israel, likely with the intent of fomenting a conflict to stabilize their own rule and that of Bashar Assad in Syria.

These trends indicate that, as has been the case since January, the Middle East will look quite different in April than it did in March. The uprisings are spreading and outside powers are playing a greater role in these internal struggles. The attacks on Israel, the largest since 2009, indicate that Iran, Syria and their terrorist allies believe a confrontation is in their interest.

Algeria

• Status - There have been clashes in Algiers over the dismantling of illegal homes and thousands of police officers have gone on strike for higher wages. The protests have significantly diminished, but that doesn’t mean that the longing for improvements no longer exists.
• Regime Response - The government has thus far been able to limit the size of protests even though the state of emergency was lifted in February.
• Stability Level - High (previous month: Moderate). The police successfully dispersed a few small protests and there were no large demonstrations able to cause the government to panic or force it to use excessive violence.
• Dependencies - One of the lessons of the Arab Spring is that apparently stable governments can quickly face a major internal challenge. Algeria has seen major protests and rioting this year and the potential for a revival of this activity must be a significant concern of the government.

Bahrain

• Status - The protesters became increasingly aggressive this month, entering the financial district of Manama in defiance of police orders and approaching the royal palace and parliament building. With protests larger than ever, the security forces raided the camps set up in Pearl Square, resulting in several civilian deaths and the destruction of the Pearl monument. Protests have largely subsided since.
• Regime Response - The regime has been assisted by the deployment of about 1,200 Saudi and 800 Emirati soldiers to the country. It has decided that force is the best option to stabilize its rule and for the moment, it has worked. There were no reported defections in the security forces.
• Stability Level - Low (previous month: Low). The rating for Bahrain remains “low” despite the dispersal of protests because demonstrations are not the only indicator of a government’s position. The anger over the use of violence has not subsided and the longing to topple the leadership remains unchanged. There are signs that Iran is planning to retaliate to the deployment of foreign troops to Bahraini soil. A government-registered website is already registering volunteers to fight and Qatar recently seized two Iranian ships loaded with arms near Bahrain.
• Dependencies - The reaction of the opposition to the deployment of foreign forces. A hardline Shiite opposition leader has stated that the presence of Saudi forces would give the opposition the right to ask for Iranian assistance. The willingness of the Iranians to intervene and the willingness of the opposition to accept such aid are key factors moving forward.

Iran

• Status - The two main opposition leaders, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi remain on house arrest and are unable to communicate with the outside world. Weekly protests have been planned to demand their release and although demonstrations have been some of the largest since 2009, the opposition must be discouraged by their size given the severity of this provocation and increasing talk of putting them on trial.
• Regime Response - The regime has increased the pace of arrests and executions of its enemies and its security forces have done an adequate job of preventing the forming of large gatherings or any major coordinated opposition activity.
• Stability Level - High (previous month: Moderate). Last month saw significant protests in Iran, specifically on the 14^th. They were only a fraction of what was seen in 2009 but showed that a vibrant opposition still exists. The two most influential opposition leaders, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrobui were placed on house arrest and possibly temporarily arrested in the aftermath. The lack of a strong response by the opposition to this action indicates that the regime’s security measures are working.
• Dependencies - The end of former President Rafsanjani’s term as chairman of the Assembly of Experts exposes the split within the Iranian regime that exists. The boldness of the faction opposed to Ahmadinejad and to a lesser degree, Khamenei is a significant factor as it could lure conservatives away from the regime. Another dependency to watch for is the potential for a spontaneous demonstration that results in the use of violence, sparking an unforeseen escalation that energizes the opposition.

Iraq

• Status - The massive protests seen in the country in February have not been repeated in March. It is not clear why this is so, but secular Shiite leader Iyad Allawi’s decision to not join the government as the head of the National Council for Strategic Policies indicates he sees Prime Minister al-Maliki as politically vulnerable and it is to his benefit to not become attached to him. The political situation in Iraq is very fragile, but the population is not keen to see the type of destructive civil conflict it has seen in the past. The protests of last month were against the competency of the government and were not about regime change or changing the democratic system of governance.
• Regime Response - The Iraqi government has been offering many concessions, including a vow to fight corruption in the government. There have been accusations of excessive force by security personnel and the trampling of the rights of political parties. The sharp decrease in protests this month indicates some progress has been made but this does not mean the Iraqi government is popular.
• Stability Level – High (previous month: Moderate). The rating for Iraq is higher this month because there was no repeat of the massive protests seen in February. The political situation is still very fragile and it is quite possible that the ruling bloc in parliament will come apart but the country did not see the violent clashes or uprisings of the intensity that forced Prime Minister al-Maliki to offer numerous concessions (including his promise not to seek a third term).
• Dependencies – The Iraqi people are demanding major improvements in the efficiency of government and this may force political parties to withdraw support for the ruling government and Prime Minister al-Maliki, sparking a political crisis. The Iraqi people want change from within the system  but there is a danger that disenchantment with democratic politics will arise if the parties are unable to cooperate in parliament and are seen as dysfunctional beyond redemption.

Kuwait

• Status - There were a few protests this month in Kuwait by Bedouins demanding better treatment and hundreds demonstrated for the resignation of the Prime Minister. This shows an encouraged and increasingly active opposition, but the protests have yet to become consistent or large enough to be called an uprising.
• Regime Response - Protesters were forcibly dispersed and this caused injuries, but there was not a backlash significant enough to energize the opposition and cause a prolonged conflict.
• Stability Level - High.
• Dependencies - There is no reason to believe that these protests will not occur in the future, and each time they happen there is a risk of them spreading or the use of force backfiring on the government. The Kuwaiti government is currently stable but must be careful not to appear indifferent to the concerns of its people, as the support for demonstrations will rise as citizens view the success of protests elsewhere in the region.

Lebanon

• Status - There were at least three major protests against Hezbollah in Beirut this month, with reportedly tens of thousands gathering at one point. The protests show a significant level of organizational ability of the opposition led by Saad Hariri and they should be expected to continue. Significantly, the themes of the protests were against sectarianism and for secular democracy.
• Regime Response - Hezbollah did not formally respond and there were no clashes. Hezbollah’s unofficial response was to put up posters stating that its disarmament was something desired by Israel.
• Stability Level – Moderate (previous month: Moderate).
• Dependencies - The potential for sectarian warfare exists if supporters of Hezbollah confront its opponents, but thus far, Hezbollah has been wary of having a confrontation. The attacks on Israel this month indicate that the Iranian-led bloc desires a conflict, but it is unclear if Hezbollah believes it would be in their interests. Another major dependency is the pending U.N. Special Tribunal indictments that will likely pin the blame for the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on Hezbollah.

Morocco

• Status - There have been protests of a few hundred people to demand more political freedom but the protests have yet to become consistent and have declined since their peak.
• Regime Response - In a rare televised address to the country, King Mohammed VI reacted to protests in the capital by announcing the creation of a commission to study constitutional changes that can be made in accordance with the demands of the people. Notably, the protesters have yet to call for his resignation and are focused on liberalization, not regime change.
• Stability Level - High (previous month: Moderate).
• Dependencies - The patience of the population to wait for the commission’s findings to be released and for change to come incrementally. In other Arab countries, the steady pace of concessions failed to stem the tide of popular unrest but the level of anti-government sentiment has not yet reached a level required for a major uprising, even if the population is strongly in favor of major changes politically and economically.

Oman

• Status - The country stood on the edge after major protests and riots happened in Sohar, which then inspired protests of about 500 people in the capital. There were several deaths, leading to legitimate worry that the country would face nationwide unrest.
• Regime Response - The Sultan gave up some power, shook up his government, fired top officials and announced various concessions. The unrest broke out after large concessions were offered, indicating that the protesters have far-reaching goals and it will be difficult to satisfy the opposition.
• Stability Level - Low (previous month: Moderate). The situation has settled down for the moment but the speed with which the situation quickly deteriorated makes the country deserving of a “low” stability rating.
• Dependencies - Employees of the country’s main airport and state oil company and hundreds of private sector workers have gone on strike and staged sit-ins to demand better treatment, so a key dependency will be the ability of those on strike to coordinate their efforts.

Palestinian Territories

• Status - There were protests in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to demand that Fatah and Hamas establish a unity government. The protests were largest in Gaza City, where the release of political prisoners and greater freedom was demanded. Hamas arrested at least six protesters. The terrorist attacks on Israel did not come long after these protests. This likely means that Hamas and its allies believe a confrontation is politically necessary.
• Regime Response - The Hamas regime announced a minor shakeup of the government and declared it had given an offer of unity to Fatah, which was rejected. These moves were undoubtedly a response to the group’s declining popularity.
• Stability Level - Moderate (previous month: Moderate).
• Dependencies - The Palestinian populations may become increasingly agitated with Hamas over its attacks on Israel, as there was no credible pretext to justify them and the population suffers when Israel retaliates. Another key dependency will be whether Fatah or Hamas takes more blame for the lack of unity, which has become a significant issue. No dates for major rallies have been announced but there is no reason to believe that the organizers of the protests have abandoned their cause.

Qatar

• Status - A planned “Day of Rage” failed in Qatar, as did a call later for a sit-in in Doha. The country does not appear to have the massive dissatisfaction required for unrest like seen in the rest of the Middle East. The demands of the protesters were mostly political, as Qatar has seen major economic growth. The population does not want to disturb the increasing prosperity being experienced.
• Regime Response - The government has not had to make any major concessions or crackdowns, making it one of the few governments in the region that has not had to cater to a strong opposition.
• Stability Level - High (previous month: High).
• Dependencies - It must be remembered how Syria looked very stable and then small protests were a precursor to a major uprising. In the current environment, the possibility of major demonstrations cannot be discounted anywhere. However, none of the signs of an impending upheaval that surfaced in the other countries can be identified in Qatar.

Saudi Arabia

• Status - A planned “Day of Rage” failed in Saudi Arabia, with the security forces preventing any major gathering in Riyadh or Jeddah. There were protests of about 200 Shiites in the Eastern Province which were dispersed with force, including the firing of rubber bullets. This did not cause a reaction like that seen in Deraa, Syria and an uprising did not result. There is definitely a strong desire for liberalization among the Shiite minority and the large youth population and there will be increasing instability as time goes on, but the Royal Family has been able to keep a handle on the dissent thus far.
• Regime Response - The regime’s security forces have prevented demonstrations in the Eastern Province from expanding into an uprising and stopped any major protest from taking place as feared. The Royal Family is also announcing extraordinary financial aid packages to shore up support. No official figure was released but a very long list of increased expenditures was announced in addition to the $36 billion package previously announced. Notably, the government said it would build more offices for the religious police, showing its desire to placate both the religious extremists and the more liberal reformers at the same time.
• Stability Level - High (previous month: High).
• Dependencies - The biggest dependency is the succession process, as King Abdullah and Crown Prince Sultan are elderly and in poor health. The third-in-line is Prince Nayef, an adversary of the liberal reformers and a friend of the religious extremists often called “Wahhabists.” It will become increasingly difficult for the government to satisfy the demands for liberal reforms from the youth population while not offending the Wahhabists and religious conservatives that view Westernization as being a threat to Islam.

Sudan

• Status - There continues to be sporadic student protests specifically calling for the immediate resignation of President Omar Bashir. The protests have not yet reached the level of an uprising and are not coordinated, but the anti-government sentiment is large enough to pose a major challenge to the regime.
• Regime Response - Security personnel and pro-government militiamen have quickly and brutally attacked and arrested the protesters and have thus far succeeding in preventing the formation of large crowds. President Omar Bashir has announced that he will not serve after his term ends in 2015, showing that he takes the domestic pressure seriously.
• Stability Level – Moderate (previous month: Moderate).
• Dependencies - President Bashir has run afoul of both the secular youth and the more Islamist elements. The students are leading the protests but Hasan al-Turabi, the extremist Muslim Brotherhood leader in Sudan, has called for his overthrow and his arrest in January immediately sparked protests. A key dependency will be the ability and willingness of these two sides to unite.

Syria

• Status - No country experienced as dramatic of a change in one month as Syria, with the exception of Libya. A “Day of Rage” planned in February failed but now there is a major uprising in Deraa in southern Syria and protests throughout the country (including Damascus) in response to the deaths of possibly over 100 protesters. The deployment of the army to Latakia is a strong example of the intensity with which the protests are increasing despite the harsh crackdown, strongly pointing towards a long-term period of unrest that will be difficult for the regime to control.
• Regime Response - The security forces have reportedly arrested hundreds of protesters and dozens have been killed and the death toll is quickly rising. The regime has offered some concessions, such as by releasing 270 political prisoners and the announcement that it will “study” potentially lifting the state of emergency.
• Stability Level - Low (previous month: High).
• Dependencies - The willingness of the security personnel to use violence against protesters and the willingness of the Iranians, Hamas and Hezbollah to send personnel to assist the Assad regime if necessary (some reports claim there are already Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah active in quelling the uprising). The Muslim Brotherhood has thus far stayed out of the unrest, though protests are taking place in its stronghold of Hama and its participation is another key factor in how the situation progresses.

United Arab Emirates

• Status - There have been no significant protests in this country but a petition has been signed by 160 intellectuals asking for democratic reform and not regime change.
• Regime Response - The government did not have to respond to any significant challenges and like Qatar, is so far immune to the unrest.
• Stability Level - High (previous month: High).
• Dependencies - The greatest dependency will be the level of inspiration that will be caused by the surrounding uprisings among the population. What may currently be a minor grievance could become a rallying point for reformists with enough momentum. However, those seeking change must also decide whether they want to risk personal harm and economic damage to the country.

Yemen

• Status - The removal of President Saleh from power appears imminent. Three of the five military zone commanders have defected, including the most powerful commander, General al-Ahmar, who ordered his troops to protect protesters from being attacked. There are clashes occurring between pro-government forces and the defected military units and there have been a huge amount of defections by tribal chiefs and government officials.
• Regime Response - President Saleh is refusing to step down and his offer to resign by the end of the year was rejected by the opposition, which is insisting upon his immediate dismissal. News reports indicate that representatives of Saleh are in the final stages of negotiating his stepping down from power.
• Stability Level - Low (previous month: Low).
• Dependencies - The willingness of Saleh to order his Republican Guard led by his son to fight for his rule and the willingness of those personnel to fight for what appears to be a lost cause.

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Regional Analysis

The war in Libya is occupying the West’s attention at the moment, as a debate has been sparked about the proper approach towards the violence exercised towards protesters throughout the region.

On one hand, the West faced a tremendous amount of pressure from the Arabs to take action as the rebel forces stood on the edge of defeat and a massacre appeared imminent. The U.N.-authorized coalition has taken action but the participating countries are evaluating how far to go to help the rebels oust Muammar Gadhafi. It would be dangerous to leave Gadhafi in power and it would require a long-term enforcement of a no-fly zone to protect the rebels, similar to the strategy employed against Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War.

On the other hand, there is a negative reaction in both the Middle East and in the West to a goal of regime change and there are significant concerns about where the loyalties and goals of the rebels lie. The Western media has focused heavily on the existence of a rebel commander who has praised Al-Qaeda and admitted that some of his fighters have battled Coalition forces in Iraq. There is bound to be an Islamist component to any government opposed to Gadhafi but it is unclear how much power they will wield.

The intervention also raises the question of consistency. The people of the West, especially the Americans, are fearful of becoming the force responsible for humanitarian interventions and are asking whether this sets a precedent requiring further action in the region when the governments use violence. For example, the Syrian government is using violence and indisputably poses a greater threat to Western interests than Gadhafi does.

It will be difficult for Western leaders supportive of the intervention in Libya to handle this debate, but the outcome of this debate will be decisive in shaping the future role of the West in the region, especially the United States.

The uprising in Syria is another decisive event in the region that began in March. The “Day of Rage” planned in February failed, but this month there were small protests including a gathering of 1,500 that formed immediately following the assault of a young man by security forces in Damascus. There were later small protests in front of the Interior Ministry and ultimately, massive protests in the southern city of Deraa, where tens were killed. The casualties sparked a major uprising in Deraa that the regime chose to stop through the use of further violence. The bloodshed sparked protests throughout Syria, causing a nationwide crisis and on March 26, the regime’s security forces pulled to the outskirts of Deraa in an attempt to defuse it.

270 political prisoners have been released and the regime says it will consider lifting the state of emergency. These concessions will be inadequate, as the large number of deaths and arrests have caused a national backlash. It must be remembered that the leadership of the regime comes from the Allawite minority, which represents only 10 to 13 percent of the population. The Kurdish minority, which has been responsible for major instability in the past, has yet to come out in force in support of the uprising but as enemies of the regime, it is very likely that they will do so.

The unrest puts the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in an awkward position. There are unconfirmed reports of Iranian Revolutionary Guards taking part in the violence and the regime may call upon terrorists it supports like Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah to assist it. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s goal, however, has always been the overthrow of the regime. Bashar Assad’s father destroyed the city of Hama in 1982 when the Muslim Brotherhood staged a revolt against him. If Hamas is asked to intervene on the side of Assad, the Brotherhood will have to decide whether to join Hamas or join in the revolution. Declining to support the revolution would jeopardize its popular support but it is ideologically committed to supporting Hamas, which is a branch of the Brotherhood.

The recent terrorist attacks on Israel, the largest since 2009, are connected to the events in Syria and the protests in the Palestinian territories, especially the Gaza Strip. There was no specific decision made by Israel that forced the hands of the terrorists. Their actions are politically-motivated and it is fair to assume that a conflict with Israel is desired to undermine the opposition against Hamas and the Assad regime. Regionally, it also empowers the Islamist elements challenging the pro-American regimes and puts the secular opposition elements in an uncomfortable position.

The arrival of Saudi and Emirati soldiers to defend the government of Bahrain is another development that will make the internal conflicts become “internationalized” as opposing sides intervene. The Bahraini government is experiencing more stability for the time being since the arrival of outside forces and the crushing of protests in Manama’s Pearl Square, but these actions are highly antagonizing to the opposition. The outside forces are being referred to as “occupation” forces and prior to their arrival, a hardline Shiite leader said that if the Saudis help the government, it would give the Shiite opposition justification to ask Iran for help. A website tied to an influential Iranian cleric, Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, has called on Shiites to fight on behalf of the Bahrainis and there are reports of calls for attacks on Saudi targets coming out of Iran. At the very least, the Iranian government has made a decision to encourage sectarian warfare in Bahrain and possibly the Gulf as a whole.

The uprising in Yemen is close to success. As stated in the “Country Focus” section, the most powerful military commander, General al-Ahmar, has defected to the opposition and there is a steady stream of tribal chiefs, government officials, members of President Saleh’s ruling party and military personnel doing the same. General al-Ahmar has ordered his soldiers to protect protesters and there are reported clashes between the military and loyalists of Saleh. News accounts report that Saleh is in the final stages of negotiating a transfer of power that permits him to stay in power until the end of the year as long as parliamentary and presidential elections are held and a new constitution is written.

However, protests are continuing and the masses have demanded nothing less than his immediate resignation. If the protesters are fired upon, it will almost certainly spark a major conflict between the military and the Republican Guards. It is unclear what the final settlement will look like, but all indications are that one is coming in the near-term that will prepare the way for the end of the Saleh regime.

Overall, the Arab world is experiencing a political and psychological revolution. The populations feel emboldened enough to challenge their rulers and each uprising intensifies the next. The goals, across the board, are economic improvements and political liberalization. It is impossible to make blanket statements about these opposition forces because of their wide diversity, making policy towards these uprisings exceptionally complicated.

Strategically, Iran stands to benefit from the instability in the Arab world. Many of the pro-American regimes are in a visibly weak position and Iran has grown closer to the Muslim Brotherhood and the other Islamist forces seeking to exploit their weaknesses. The protests have spread into almost every single country in the region, yet Iran has remained relatively stable despite its population’s dissatisfaction with the regime.

This shift in power works to Iran’s advantage, but that does not mean that there are currents that run contrary to its interests. The most obvious example is in Syria, where the pressure on the ruling government is at its strongest level since 1982. The opposition today is more diverse and is spread across the country, as opposed to being located in one geographic area that can be clamped down upon or if necessary, destroyed as happened to Hama. There are also large protests against Hezbollah in Lebanon and smaller but very significant protests against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In the pro-American Arab countries where Iranian allies are advancing, there also exists more secular forces that may be disorganized but have the potential to undermine the ideology of radical Islam and limit Islamist gains.

The potential of regional war, either through direct conventional warfare or non-state actors, increased this month. Major attacks were launched against Israel, a likely attempt to provoke a conflict in order to stabilize the rule of the Syrian government and Hamas and increase the popularity of Islamist opposition forces in the Arab world. At the same time, there are strong signs that Iran is planning to instigate and support armed conflict in Bahrain and possibly elsewhere in the Gulf in reaction to the deployment of Gulf Cooperation Council forces.

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Regional Outlook

The Libyan rebels, with the help of the coalition intervention, have repulsed the offensives of Gadhafi’s forces and recaptured Ajdabiya. It is certain that eastern Libya will be free of his grip, though low-level conflict such as the dispatching of assassination squads may very well continue. The coalition’s stated goal is not regime change and the West’s military forces will not assist the rebels in marching towards Tripoli, Sirte and other major cities currently under Gadhafi’s control. The most likely outcome is therefore the setting up of an opposition government with Benghazi as the capital and Gadhafi remaining in power, as the rebels lack the weapons and training to march forward without significant outside support.

It would be a mistake to assume that a ceasefire and the creation of a government in the rebel-controlled areas of Libya will end the conflict. It is highly unlikely that Gadhafi will not seek some sort of revenge or give up his goal of retaking all of Libya, and the rebels will not surrender their objective of overthrowing him. For the foreseeable future, Libya will be in a state of conflict unless a sudden turn of events results in Gadhafi’s removal from power.

As previously stated, the negotiations to end Saleh’s rule are widely reported to be in the final stages. The Yemeni government under the helm of President Saleh has been a significant ally in combating Al-Qaeda and it is an opponent of Iran. However, his removal from office is certain to happen by the end of the year, at the absolute latest. It is very likely it will happen in the near-term. The West would be most pleased with a military takeover to allow for as stable of a transitional period as possible but it is unavoidable that Islah, the Muslim Brotherhood affiliate in the country, will make major gains. The Houthi rebels in the north that have been extensively backed by Iran in their violent challenges to the Yemeni government will be able to assert themselves locally as the central government is distracted. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in the Abyan, Shabwan and Marib Provinces will also benefit, as the new government will likely be more hostile to the U.S. and the fight against Al-Qaeda is not a major public concern at this point in time.

A conflict between Hamas and Israel is very possible in the near-term. As mentioned, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and their sponsors appear to have calculated that a confrontation with Israel is in their interest. If protests continue in the Gaza Strip and the unrest escalates in Syria, as it seems it will, the provocations against Israel will increase. If the U.N. Special Tribunal indicts Hezbollah and/or Syria in the murder of Rafiq Hariri, a political crisis will begin in Lebanon. At this point, Hezbollah may also be tempted into joining or starting a conflict with Israel to stabilize its own position in the hopes that protests against it will cease to avoid looking supportive of Israel and to avoid physical danger from the conflict.

These intra-government conflicts will play an increasing role as each seeks to improve its strategic position in light of the unrest. One of the most frightening scenarios is a sectarian war stoked by Iran. It is difficult not to see the conflict in Bahrain in sectarian terms. The ruling government is Sunni and is backed by neighboring Sunni governments, while the population is about 70 percent Shiite. The effort by some Iranian ayatollahs to encourage Shiites to fight on behalf of the Bahraini Shiite opposition could spark a true sectarian war in Bahrain that could spill over into Saudi Arabia’s Shiite-majority Eastern Province.

The Iranian government is in a relatively stable position in comparison to the pro-American Arab governments and the temptation undoubtedly exists for Iran to exploit the unrest. The Iranian government must decide whether to remain neutral as the Arab regimes become increasingly unstable, offering only vocal support to the Shiite minorities or whether it is best to become involved now and if so, to what degree. It is in the interests of the Iranian government to cultivate ties to the Shiite opposition forces in the region now that can be utilized as they grow in power. So far, Iran has judged that it is in its best interest to not become heavily involved but the licensing of a website in Iran to register fighters to go to Bahrain is a strong indication that it is re-evaluating its posture.

There is no indication that the unrest in Syria is going to cease without major violent suppression. As the regime becomes more frustrated as concessions and force fail to stabilize its rule, the likelihood will increase that a conflict with Israel will be instigated. A conflict will also become more likely once the U.N. indicts Hezbollah and possibly Syrian officials for the 2005 assassination of Rafiq Hariri, which will cause a political crisis in Lebanon. At that time, the Syrian government, Hamas and Hezbollah all will be facing political pressure that they may conclude can be solved by having a war with Israel. Hezbollah’s reaction to its current pressure has been to emphasize its ability to fight Israel, indicating that the terrorist group believes this is its most potent theme.

The Islamist forces like the Muslim Brotherhood are undoubtedly the most well-positioned to take advantage of the political liberalization and overall instability in the region. This is detrimental to the West’s interests but it is unlikely the Islamists will solely govern any of the countries affected by the uprisings. The liberalization will inevitably lead to greater political, cultural and theological diversity that will permit alternative viewpoints to arise.