Expert Analysis: Iran's Calculus After the US & Israel Elections
In the space of eight days, elections in Israel and the United States weakened the current leaders of Iran’s two principal adversaries. Israel’s October 27 vote left Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc 8 seats short of a majority, and the November 3 midterms handed Democrats both chambers of Congress, while the US naval blockade of Iranian ports and Iran’s restrictions on Hormuz shipping remain in place. In a new report, Wikistrat asked seven leading Iran specialists how Tehran reads the two results, what it wants most from Washington, and how far it is prepared to push
Wikistrat surveyed the panel on November 6 and 7, days after both votes, drawing on specialists from leading US and UK universities, think tanks, and media. Some of the key insights are presented below.
Tehran Reads the Midterms as Vindication
In Tehran, the midterm results landed as proof that imposing costs on Washington works. Most of the panel expects Iran to bargain harder in the coming weeks, holding out for sanctions relief, an end to the blockade, and security guarantees. Sina Toossi of the Center for International Policy expects the result to make Tehran “less willing to accept a ceasefire that merely allows the US to regroup and attack again.”
Hormuz Is the Lever
Economic relief is what Iran wants most, and the Strait of Hormuz is how it plans to get it. The strait drew more first-place votes than any other Iranian goal, and the experts who rank it highest see it as Tehran’s tool for breaking the blockade and forcing economic concessions.
Washington Decides Whether Israel Strikes
Tehran welcomes Netanyahu’s weakness, but Iranian leaders separate Israel’s ability to launch a strike from its ability to sustain a campaign without the US. With critics of Israel gaining seats in both chambers of Congress, they judge Israel’s pull in Washington to have weakened. They don’t expect the hostility to leave with Netanyahu. In the words of Sina Azodi of George Washington University: “Another prime minister may be less inclined to go to war, but the animosity will not change.”
Escalate to Force a De-escalation
Most of the panel expects Tehran to take more risks on the nuclear file now and to hold the program as a bargaining chip. The panel splits on how hard Iran will push elsewhere. Some experts expect calibrated pressure with diplomatic channels kept open, and others expect sharper moves against shipping, energy, and infrastructure. Ahmad Hashemi of the Global Policy Institute states the hawkish case bluntly: “Iran will escalate to force a de-escalation.”
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