The Houthis and the Saudi War in Yemen
With Iran holding Hormuz and the Houthis now threatening Bab al-Mandab, both maritime chokepoints around the Arabian Peninsula are contested, and Yemen is back at the center of Saudi security planning. On September 23, Wikistrat hosted Gulf expert Dr. Cinzia Bianco to assess what reactivated the Houthi campaign against the kingdom, how it's affecting Saudi oil exports and domestic politics, and which military and diplomatic options Riyadh is weighing
Webinar Recording:
Dr. Cinzia Bianco is a Visiting Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, where she works on political, security, and economic developments in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf, as well as the region's relations with Europe. She holds a PhD in Middle East Politics from the University of Exeter and is the author of The Gulf Monarchies After the Arab Spring: Threats and Security (Manchester University Press, 2024).
Executive Summary
1. The Houthi turn against Riyadh tracks the U.S.-Iran war
When the Iran war began, Riyadh quickly reached an understanding with the Houthis that kept them from escalating against the kingdom. That arrangement flipped almost overnight about 2 months before the webinar. Yemen's domestic situation offered no clear trigger, so the timing points to the U.S.-Iran war: Tehran and the Houthis appear to have seen it as the moment to put extraordinary pressure on Saudi Arabia.
2. A hawkish Houthi faction pushes escalation, and Iran arms it
Houthi decision-making sits somewhere between full independence and Iranian orders. One faction inside the movement believes that raising the threshold raises the price of any eventual deal with Riyadh, and Iran backs that faction. After 12 years of war, the Houthis can build cheap drones and low-level munitions, but they still depend on Iranian materials and components.
3. Riyadh moved to cut a new Iranian supply line
The Houthis justify their campaign by claiming Saudi Arabia reimposed an embargo on Yemen, a claim the available information contradicts. Saudi military intelligence tracked flights and boats arriving directly from Iran, and Riyadh acted to stop that new flow. Within weeks, the Houthis were striking Saudi ships, infrastructure in the south, and energy facilities.
4. The Houthis chose Bab al-Mandab over Marib's oil
The Houthis bypassed Marib, the oil-rich province most observers had marked as their next objective, and drove west to Mocha and Perim Island. The move is an attempt to repeat Iran's Hormuz playbook at Bab al-Mandab. The Houthis have partly set their domestic agenda aside and increasingly want recognition as a regional actor.
5. Bab al-Mandab threatens Saudi Arabia's Hormuz workaround
Saudi Arabia had been moving about 90% of its oil through the East-West pipeline to the Red Sea to bypass Hormuz. Tankers bound for Asia still have to cross Bab al-Mandab, and the Houthis now target any ship sailing to or from Saudi ports, whatever its flag. The alternatives are costly and limited: sailing through Suez and around Africa, or trucking small volumes to Omani ports.
6. Saudi Arabia won't fight a ground war in Yemen
Riyadh has no willingness to commit its own troops. The Saudi army has never been tested in ground operations, and Yemen's terrain, comparable to Afghanistan's, promises a long, slow, high-casualty campaign. Riyadh would want an international coalition behind any new push by Yemeni forces, and Washington has no appetite for one.
7. Riyadh wants a narrow U.S. operation along the coast
The Saudi request to Washington is limited. Riyadh wants U.S. air and naval support to push Houthi forces off exposed positions on the west coast, which would remove their ability to threaten closure of Bab al-Mandab. Saudi officials argue those coastal positions are vulnerable to air power in a way the northern mountains never were. President Trump has shown little interest, possibly with the midterms in mind.
8. Every alternative partner carries a cost in Yemen
Bringing in Turkey would give a strategic foothold on Saudi Arabia's southern border to a NATO member whose regional clout is comparable to Riyadh's. Pakistan would first need to learn Yemen's terrain and politics. Riyadh is deliberately holding back from bringing new partners into Yemen and has asked even Washington only for support on a specific operation.
9. The Saudi-UAE split runs through Yemen
Yemen went from the file where Riyadh and Abu Dhabi cooperated most closely to the one that divides them. UAE-backed forces contributed little to stopping the Houthi push to the coast. Accounts also point to a wider collapse of the command chain, and each side has blamed the other's proxies. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi share the short-term goal of pushing the Houthis back and diverge on the long-term plan.
10. Ideology binds the Houthis to Iran
The Houthis' most significant financial gains have come through negotiations with Riyadh, while Iran supplies the capabilities that strengthen their negotiating position. Their bond with Tehran is ideological, based on a shared anti-imperialist, anti-U.S., and anti-Israel worldview taught in Houthi schools. The group's demands are maximalist, starting with full political control of Yemen.
11. A stalemate is the likeliest outcome
The Houthis have the upper hand but no military hegemony. In a battle of several days in which government forces collapsed, the Houthis took Mocha and pushed on to Perim Island. Government counterattacks have since retaken some ground, and Saudi Arabia has resumed its own air campaign.
12. Houthi assurances on shipping may hide a wider target
The Houthis reportedly told the United States they would target only Saudi-linked ships even if they took Bab al-Mandab. There are two readings. The pledge could cover a plan to close the strait and charge tolls, which was already under discussion over the summer. Alternatively, Iran and the Houthis want Saudi Arabia specifically, either to drive up oil prices before U.S. elections or to push Riyadh off its gray-zone position in the war, though the precise aim remains unclear.
13. Riyadh's scenarios range from isolation to an Iran deal
Bianco laid out three scenarios from the Saudi perspective:
Worst case: Riyadh fails to react, or is seen as failing to react. That would mean the Mecca defense pact and the new maritime coalition stay inactive and U.S. support never comes. The kingdom would then leave the war as a passive recipient of whatever regional security architecture follows. The domestic strategic-patience narrative is already harder to sustain. Bianco says Saudi officials are still weighing options, which suggests they believe they have margin.
Best case: The Houthi escalation becomes Riyadh's entry point to a broad deal with Iran, something it has sought since the Saudi-Iranian talks that produced the 2023 Beijing Agreement. This looks unlikely because Tehran denies any involvement.
Black swan: China or, more likely, Russia, which has deeper ties to the Houthis, brokers a Houthi-Saudi deal over Iran's head. That would weaken the Houthi-Iran bond but widen the gap between Riyadh and Washington.
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