Expert Analysis: The Gulf States' Response to a US-Iran Deal

Whatever Washington and Tehran negotiate next will set the terms for Gulf security through the 2030s. In a new report, Wikistrat asked eight leading authorities on Gulf affairs how Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar will actually respond to the deal taking shape, where the red lines are, and where the experts sharply disagree about what comes next

With talks on a US-Iran deal underway, every Gulf capital is reading the draft through the same lens: what does Iran keep, what does it give up, and where does that leave the region? To answer those questions, Wikistrat surveyed eight leading authorities on Gulf security in April 2026. Some of the insights are presented below.

Hormuz Is the Red Line

The Iran War converted the Strait of Hormuz from a background vulnerability into the single most consequential post-war problem. No Gulf state will passively accept a settlement that leaves Iran with de facto control over the chokepoint, and the UAE has emerged as the hardest red-line-holder in the region. Seven of eight experts said the UAE would refuse to accept such an outcome quietly. Saudi Arabia and Qatar scored only marginally higher, and for structural rather than political reasons. For most of the panel, Hormuz tops the list of post-war threats to Gulf security.

The Missile Question Has Already Been Answered

The experts were unanimous on what happens if Iran refuses ballistic missile limits. All eight said the Gulf states would significantly escalate their own military capabilities within three years. There were no dissenters. The buildup is already in motion through expanded UAE drone and air defense programs, large Qatari procurement packages with European suppliers, and Saudi missile holdings that include Chinese ballistic systems.

The rearmament has three clear features: indigenous defense joint ventures, deeper European partnerships, and procurement decisions increasingly made without reference to U.S. preferences.

The Saudi Bomb: The Survey's Sharpest Disagreement

The probability that Saudi Arabia pursues nuclear weapons within ten years is the question on which the panel splits most sharply. Under a threshold Iran outcome that retains enrichment, three experts rated Saudi nuclear pursuit as near-certain. Two rated it unlikely. The cascade camp treats the Saudi decision as essentially already taken.

The skeptics point to alternative pathways, including a Pakistani nuclear umbrella that Riyadh could extract at lower political cost than building its own capability.

Israel Is Not the Hedge Washington Thinks It Is

The American assumption that Saudi Arabia would respond to a bad Iran deal by accelerating toward normalization with Israel is not supported by the panel. No respondent rated the likelihood above the midpoint. The Gaza war made the political price too high, and the U.S. commitments paired with the 2023-24 normalization track have not materialized. Riyadh's preferred hedge runs through bilateral diplomacy with Tehran rather than realignment with Jerusalem.

The full report breaks down the findings across six analytical sections, with named expert assessments on each.

Download the full report here