Wagner’s challenge to Putin’s authority on June 24, while shocking, was short-lived. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner mercenary group, has left Rostov-on-don after a deal brokered by Belarusian president, Alexander Lukashenko. Prigozhin will go into exile in Belarus, avoiding prosecution along with his mercenary soldiers. As the events were unfolding, Wikistrat held a webinar with Keir Giles, an expert on Russian security issues.
This webinar was held during an ongoing event and as such, most analysis is relevant to the time period in which the conversation took place i.e. June 24, 6 PM London time / 1 PM ET.
Keir Giles is an expert on security issues affecting Russia and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. He is a senior consulting fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House and the director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre.
Transcript:
Keir Giles:
Hello, everybody. I'm going to be really quite brief for all of the reasons that Oren just outlined. First of all, this is a very fluid, dynamic situation and so getting into the detail, the tactical level of what's happening is probably going to be both misleading and out of date. And also because it would be good to leave as much time as possible for Q&A.
But this is one of those unusual situations where it's actually far easier to tell what the longer-term implications are going to be than how things are actually going to unfold over the next 48 hours or even the next week. Because however, the situation with Wagner and Prigozhin resolves itself, whether it is resolved quietly or whether there is an open confrontation, what's happened in the longer term is that the foundations of Putin's power were shaken. They've been undermined because the idea that he had this unity of power across the whole of Russia and that he didn't have a firm grip on all of the different agencies of government under his command has actually been fatally torpedoed because you have an armed group that is roaming the south of Russia and demanding parity and respect from government organizations in a way that is absolutely antithetical to everything that Putin has tried to do over the last 20 plus years, centralizing power in his own hands.
So this is a wild card that has got out of hand, which comes onto the question that Oren posted, which is why this has happened, and the question that Russia watchers have been asking themselves over the last several weeks, in fact, watching Prigozhin, watching how his attacks on the Ministry of Defense and on the military have become more and more bold and brazen and lunatic, you could say. They've been asking the question, well, who is protecting him and what is the actual endgame?
And the conclusion that we're reaching in a lot of the conversations with other Russia watchers at the moment is that he's become unmoored from whatever the original purpose was that he was put in place for and empowered to do. Because there's no doubt that Prigozhin was given both an explicit and an implicit license to break the rules. You could see that he was being protected against the consequences of his actions when he took on the army and embarked on outrageous actions like kidnapping senior army officers, beating them up, and extracting confessions from them with apparently no consequences whatsoever. So plainly, he had protection from anybody that would ordinarily chop him off at the knees for doing something like that.
But then also there's that long-term aspect of him being given the exemption from what passes for the rule of law in Russia. This is an organization that was explicitly operating outside the legal framework. It could carry out extrajudicial murders with a nod and a wink from the Kremlin. It could pardon people from prisons and extract them from the penitentiary system, really, at will. It was something that was set up as a completely external system of power, and that's where when we saw that development, we thought that this was going to be a challenge to the stability and security of power in Russia. Because if you think about what keeps Russia under control, what keeps it stable, it's that pyramid under Putin of people who share a common mutual interest, of people who operate together and don't want to disrupt that. Because if you make it unstable, you threaten your own health, family, fortunes, et cetera, because you can be evicted from that group.
And then Prigozhin is set up as an external force, as something that isn't subject to those rules and those understandings that bind that pyramid together, and that was always going to have the potential to be a disruptive force, and so it has turned out.
Now, what exactly triggered this final move? Well, it does look as though it was a response to the showdown between Wagner and the MOD when the MOD was finally trying to reign in Wagner's power and Prigozhin was having none of it. And that seems to have precipitated these statements and actions from Wagner, which it does seem were not spontaneous. They have presented this as a response to the alleged shelling of a Wagner encampment by the Russian Ministry of Defense on very, very flimsy evidence. And there's a lot of circumstantial detail which suggested this was actually being prepared long in advance.
So, why? There's a plausible explanation that Prigozhin, seeing that power was slipping out of his hands and realizing that he had exceeded his remit, decided on a throw of dice for himself out of his own interest and actually to go against the system of power that actually put him in place. And that does go along with the way in which he's become a totally loose cannon and is now being disowned by Putin himself. Although, interestingly, just like Navalny, Putin will not say his name in these speeches, invoking 1917 and talking about the threat to the state.
So for Prigozhin, it's win or lose everything, and it is startling most of all that he has not yet been stopped, that Russia does not seem to have the capacity or the will to actually prevent Wagner from doing what it is doing, taking over the military headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, and then moving northwards. Apparently, all of these roadblocks from the security intelligence force are completely failing to impede their progress. And if we believe what seems to be the fairly plausible reports of what's going on as they move along, Wagner actually not being opposed, but actually gathering more supporters. You can understand why they might actually find people who are in sympathy with what they're trying to do and in sympathy with their criticisms of the Ministry of Defense along the way.
And the fact that we now have Moscow effectively preparing for the arrival of this armed group as though it were an invading army from a foreign country is just indicative of how seriously the situation is being taken there. In fact, it suggests nothing less than panic on the part of the Russian state authorities. And it has to be said, Putin hasn't helped coming out with bluster and rhetoric this morning, saying that this was intolerable, but not actually presenting a plan for dealing with it, and worst of all, pointing to the example of 1917 as something to avoid, and we all know how 1917 ended with this precise same situation.
So unfortunately, the short answer to why is this happening now is we don't know, but we did see the precursors for it building up for some considerable time, and we know that this is one of the most significant political developments that we've seen throughout the whole of Putin's reign, and it has the potential to be one of those incidents that develops into something which is far more significant in a Russian historical context. It's not just Putin that is thinking of 1917 at this point.
So it's all very exciting. It's all moving incredibly fast. It has Russia watchers across the world watching agog and getting the popcorn out because this is the moment that so many of them have been watching and waiting for and almost not daring to hope for so long. And I think Oren is absolutely right. By the time we finish this conversation, we'll probably have a completely new situation on the ground in Russia once again.
So I'm sorry I couldn't give a definitive answer to that, but I'm hoping that there might at least be one or two questions that we can give answers to through the Q&A.
Oren Kesler:
So let me tackle you with one that I think will also have a very difficult way to answer it. What are the endgame goals that Prigozhin has in this situation? Is he surprised by his success, do you think? Is he waiting to succeed in a way that will be to topple the regime? Is he waiting for some sort of a deal with Putin? What are the endgame goals that he has?
Keir Giles:
Well, we know at least what he said his endgame goals were, and that was to induce the Ministry of Defense and the military to wage war on Ukraine in a more efficient manner, and that's mutated into seeking justice from the Ministry of Defense in response to the real and the imagined slight to Wagner that he's been cataloging. Not just the supposed attack on Wagner, but also starving Wagner of munitions and so on throughout the course of the campaign. So that's his stated aim.
However, if it is the case that he's now become unmoored from what his original purpose was and is playing for much bigger stakes now, then who knows? There could be a point at which this movement that he's making gathers sufficient momentum that he doesn't really have a choice other than a complete showdown with Russian state authority overall rather than just the Ministry of Defense and the army.
Oren Kesler:
Now, all of this is happening in the background of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, which has been prepared and waited for so long. What impact will this event have on the Russian frontlines, if any?
Keir Giles:
It seems there's no immediate impact. These Wagner forces, the Wagner main force was not actually on the frontline. It had been removed. Now, of course, there is going to be a period during which Russian troops on the frontline are confused and looking over their shoulders thinking, "What is happening?" But there doesn't seem to be any indication that they're being pulled back to deal with this problem in Russia itself.
In the longer term, once again, it is clearer because what this also... The other myth that this shatters is the myth that you cannot defeat Russia, because if Russia is busy defeating itself at home, that removes all of the arguments that so many people have been putting forward for restraint in supporting Ukraine and eventually potentially forcing Ukraine into a ceasefire or a negotiated settlement because you don't believe that Russia can, in fact, be defeated on the battlefield. So that argument is going to evolve significantly, I would hope, in Western capitals that are backing Ukraine over the next few days and weeks.
Oren Kesler:
Is there any implication on the possibility of the use of any type or the increasing threat of the use of nuclear weapons by Russia caused by this event?
Keir Giles:
No, not at all. Really, the chance of Russia nuking one of its own major cities to deal with Wagner is even less than the already minuscule chance of Russia using a nuclear weapon anywhere in Ukraine or beyond. I don't think that makes any difference at all.
The only wildcard scenario there is if it accelerates Russia's plans to create some kind of diversionary nuclear incident using the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant. But still, you have to have a situation in which the decision-making process within the Kremlin thinks that is going to make things better, not worse. And it's very hard to see, even if you try to insert yourself in that Russian logical prism, how you can arrive at that conclusion in any of the ways in which this scenario plays out now.
Oren Kesler:
I'm going to rephrase a question asked by the audience. Is there any possibility that this is a false flag operation conducted by the Russians themself, i.e. Putin?
Keir Giles:
Yeah, that's a question that's been thrown about very actively lately because... Well, it's partly because so little of this actually makes sense. There was a period at which you could believe that one of the purposes of setting Prigozhin up to do what he did was actually to bolster Putin's own popularity.
However, once again, even if that was the case to start with, it has now got out of hand and Putin is showing this as a direct threat to his own power, which you would not do. You would not admit that if it was a false flag operation. It does seem to be being taken sufficiently seriously as a real threat by Putin and by the security and intelligence forces, which says to me that this is not a situation like you might have had in previous decades with, for example, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the puppet opposition that is put in place solely as a strawman to try to bolster support for the actual real authorities. Prigozhin hasn't just said the stuff Vladimir Zhirinovsky did, he's done it, and that is a very different thing.
Oren Kesler:
What is the level of support that Wagner and Prigozhin are enjoying from among the FSP and the military in general, maybe the lower ranks, mid-level, and lower ranks? Is it enough for them to gain popular support among them to increase their power as they go, or is it they're not popular at all and they might be seen as a threat to the Russian nation?
Keir Giles:
It's an absolutely key question, and unfortunately, we have no way of knowing. We can make some educated guesses about what the different agencies might feel about Wagner given the ways in which they've interacted in the past. What we can't tell is what happens when these people come face-to-face, because some of the things that'll happen on a very localized tactical level will actually determine how this goes. Whether a Wagner convoy does get through a checkpoint or is obstructed, whether a military unit or a headquarters in a town which they are moving through decides that actually they are going to help or facilitate or even join Wagner, and that's going to be decided on a case-by-case basis. So this is one of the reasons why it is exceptionally hard at the moment to see how this is going because our visibility into what's happening on that local level is bad and getting worse, partly as a result of the Russian authorities' efforts now to constrain internet traffic in an attempt to shut off Prigozhin's means of messaging the public. So that overall picture of how this is going is going to be increasingly unreliable.
Oren Kesler:
If the scenario of Prigozhin actually taking power and taking over control, or some sort of a coalition with him taking over, what impact will it have on the war in Ukraine? Will it mean the end of the war in Ukraine or will it mean the escalation of it?
Keir Giles:
If Prigozhin does what he says he is going to do, then it will mean a more efficient prosecution of the war on Ukraine. There's no gap between the endgames, and the end objectives of Prigozhin and Putin as to what they actually want to do to Ukraine. Where they differ is in how to go about it. And of course, just recently, we had Prigozhin undermining, undercutting all of the myths that Putin had put in place about why the war was launched in the first place. But to be fair, of course, Putin had done a fair amount of that himself.
So there's no reason to suspect that Prigozhin acquiring more power and influence in Moscow, in whichever form it takes, would actually make any difference to Russia remaining a threat to Ukraine, and later on, to other parts of Europe, as well.
Oren Kesler:
This is a question from the audience. What impact will this have on countries bordering Russia at the moment? Obviously, we have close neighbors, which used to be a part of the former USSR, and that will have some sort of impact on their conflicts with Russia, and there are the ones that are the major powers in the regions such as China, even Turkey, et cetera. How do you see this evolving and impacting them or impact their relations with Russia, regardless if this is successful or not?
Keir Giles:
Well, the interesting thing is, in each of the cases around the periphery, this is a scenario for which people have been watching, and so they will be prepared because, ever since the course on which Russia embarked became clear, people have been considering the possibility of internal instability and conflict within Russia itself, and of course for the Western peripheral states, for the Baltic States, Poland, et cetera, Finland, Sweden. This is a return to the situation that they had in the 1990s when the biggest threats from Russia actually were as a result of that instability generating problems that spilled over the border as opposed to being deliberately invaded like Ukraine.
So everybody's watching carefully, everybody's responding in their own particular way. Latvia, for example, has now closed its border to Russians altogether in order to protect itself while saying, "We don't see any immediate threat." They want to prevent an immediate threat from actually arising.
Meanwhile, China, of course, is in the same position that China always was. They can sit back, watch and pick up the pieces as necessary afterward. So it's a different picture from each individual country around the periphery that looks at it. But of course, this is not coming completely out of the blue and it's not a surprise. It's one of the range of outcomes that everybody's been discussing for a long time from Russia's failure to win the war on Ukraine in three days as they expected to.
Oren Kesler:
Another question from the crowd. Who, if anyone, would like to see this move succeed and why? Meaning the move of Prigozhin and his run to Moscow.
Keir Giles:
Well, if you leave aside the rather frivolous glee with which a lot of Russia watchers have actually been watching this unfold because it is highly entertaining to watch, of course, who would want this to actually go through? You could see how, up until say a month ago, most of the things that Prigozhin said and did could be interpreted as, in one way or another, serving Putin's interest in going along with the outcomes that he might like to see. But it's only after that, as I talked about a couple of times already, he appears to have gone off the rails, exceeded his remit, and started being a problem instead of an asset.
So who apart from Prigozhin would actually benefit from this? Well, anybody that will see opportunities in the chaos and the redistribution of power and money and influence that would happen as a result of it. So I have no doubt that there will be opportunists who will actually be allying themselves with Prigozhin because they have decided that actually he stands a chance at success, and therefore they should be along with him to make sure that they don't miss out.
Oren Kesler:
One of the questions we received from the audience over here is about the Chechens, some of them are being called on Twitter the TikTok Warriors of Kadyrov. How are you going to see them impacting this whole move? Are they going to be able to affect it, to influence it, or are we likely to see them basically drawing back to defend their leader as things escalate?
Keir Giles:
I would be extremely surprised if they did, in fact, take an active role in trying to deal with Wagner. I would be even more surprised if they tried that and it actually turned out to be effective. So if there were an exception to the rule and this organization, this entity did in fact try to do something useful, it would be quite a surprise. I think it is far more likely that they will be looking to secure their own position and their own allegiance, which to some extent will mean step stepping back and waiting to see who comes out on top of this.
Oren Kesler:
We saw today a statement by the Belarusian Legion that is fighting in Ukraine, calling the people in Belarus to also rebel and fight against Lukashenko there. How do you see this situation impacting the situation in Belarus and the possibility of a similar situation happening there?
Keir Giles:
Well, there's no doubt that it sets an example. The problem is, of course, in Belarus, you do not have that same internal element that is actually in a position to challenge Lukashenko. And for all of the goodwill behind calling on Belarusians to resist, there's not actually that kind of popular uprising that we see yet within Russia that they're calling on them to mirror. So it will, for the time being, probably just put people in danger without the likelihood of a positive outcome to it.
On the other hand, however, it also sets an example for those elements of the Belarusian regular armed forces that are deeply unhappy with the situation that's evolved with Russia's war on Ukraine and is resisting as hard as possible Russia's attempt to outsource its security and to incorporate Belarus as a province of Russia. If there were sufficient will and bravery within those elements of the Belarusian armed forces, I mean, the regular military to actually do something about it, then this presents a case study of how something might actually be achievable in potentially removing Lukashenko from power and bringing about a transition of government in Minsk, which would, in theory, be far easier to do than in Moscow itself.
Oren Kesler:
What impact will this situation have on Wagner's operation elsewhere around the world, specifically in Africa, likely scenario or not likely scenario that this will actually go along and succeed or not succeed? How do you see this impacting their operations in those countries?
Keir Giles:
Well, there's the actual operational impact, which is likely to make itself felt over the next few days if Wagner survives that long. Because we've seen the flows of personnel and the flows of resources to and from Africa as Wagner's involvement in the Ukraine conflict and in its original background sort of shifts in emphasis between the two.
If this turns into an ongoing confrontation between Wagner and it maintains for several weeks, then obviously they will be looking to bring in resources from elsewhere. It's probably had a substantial impact on Wagner, for example, that the raids on their headquarters have removed the vast quantities of cash that they were holding in reserve for paying for some of their ongoing operations. All of that will need to be dealt with if Wagner is going to do something sustainable, and you could well imagine that they might be drawing down some of their operations in other areas in order to bring back those people that they can rely on to support what's happening in Russia itself.
Now, of course, the potential outcome of this is a catastrophic failure by Prigozhin and a major miscalculation, is that it will discredit and undermine everything that Wagner has done elsewhere. And that presents an opportunity for the countries that have sat back and watched in a certain amount of dismay but also in action as Wagner representing Russia has made inroads in all of these different places across Africa and gained the influence that Western powers were quite willing to relinquish. And so stepping back in would become very much easier.
Oren Kesler:
Are we likely to see any potential other warlords in Russia taking part in this or joining Wagner or joining Putin or playing their own part as part of this situation evolving?
Keir Giles:
Not the warlords, per se. If we're thinking about the oligarchs that have PMCs, let's not forget, Wagner is just one of a constellation of different private military companies.
Wagner stands apart in a way because of how it evolved, and how it came into being. Wagner was one of the main focuses of Prigozhin's empire, and it's one of the ways in which he made his fortune, which is the reverse of what happened with most of the other oligarchs that have their private armies. They became super wealthy and then institutionalized a paramilitary arm to achieve some of the things they wanted to do. So it's a fundamentally different character between Wagner and any of the other organizations that you might think were comparable.
In terms of who might throw in their lot with Prigozhin if it looks like he might be achieving success, that too is completely unpredictable. That pyramid of power that I mentioned is completely stable until it starts to crumble and then it will move very fast. Because as soon as people see that its days are numbered, they will be running for the exits and they will want to align themselves with whichever new center of power appears to be emerging. And if that turns out to be Prigozhin, then so be it.
Oren Kesler:
Acknowledging that currently, the US is taking a policy of observing and doing nothing in terms of looking into the situation, what other actions should they be taking and what other actions should they be considering in the case of, one, Wagner and Prigozhin actually be managing to take over, or two, this actually not succeeding?
Keir Giles:
Well, sitting back and watching is of course the best thing that you can possibly do at the moment because we all know about not interrupting your enemy when he is making a mistake. And for as long as this confrontation continues and sucks in the resources, the manpower, and the attention of Russia's leadership and its military agency, that makes life a great deal easier for everybody else.
Now, there are some very good don'ts, what not to do in the event of either of those outcomes that have been summarized this afternoon by Nigel Gould-Davies of IISS very effectively, looking at the potential dangers of how Western countries might respond to either a transition of power or Prigozhin being slapped down and Putin becoming more secure, both of which he feels might actually in induce Western countries, in their normal habit, to offer some kind of sweetener to Russia because either they are reconfirmed in their idea that Putin is the better devil and it could be much worse, so better keep him on the side. Or you see a change of regime and you assume by default that, because it's not Putin, it's got to be better. Both of these mistakes we've seen repeatedly throughout the history of Russia's relations with the West in the post-Cold War period and absolutely crucial not to repeat that now in a situation where there's this active war ongoing in Ukraine.
Oren Kesler:
The same question looking into China. Are we looking into a situation where China interferes in some sort of way to protect Putin? Or for them, any situation that weakens Russia is good for them, so they will not interfere?
Keir Giles:
Now, here I have to put an essential caveat. I'm not a China expert, and I see we do actually have some very deep China experts on the call who will have their own opinions on this. I still think China has the luxury even more than the United States of being able just to sit and wait this one out because there is not going to be any threat to China from what this happens. There might be a potential threat of some form or another to the United States as allies, but if there is chaos and disorder in Russia, that creates opportunities in the long term.
Oren Kesler:
Now, we have two more minutes, so I'm going to ask you if you can summarize a little bit about how you see this thing evolving. And I know, as we said in the beginning, this is an hour-by-hour situation, but looking forward and putting your crystal ball out, how do you see this evolving and ending, in a way?
Keir Giles:
I wouldn't bet on this any more than I would bet on a horse race. It is completely unpredictable for so many of the different reasons that we've laid out. There is not one single factor in the short term that you can point to and say, "We know how this is going to develop." And that's one of the really bizarre features of what's happening in Russia at the moment. It is a key factor of Russia watching that you have, on occasion, to get used to believing six impossible things before breakfast, and now they are all coming at once. So all of the things that were previously held as certainties by a certain section of Russia watchers in the West have now exploded, and in effect, all bets are off.
So I am sorry, but I'm going to duck the question and not give you a prediction for what happens next.
Oren Kesler:
Mr. Keir Giles, thank you so much for participating in this. And I apologize to everybody. I received comments that people are saying this is too short, but unfortunately, Keir is a very popular person right now, as you can assume and guess. So thank you so much for taking the time and participating in this Q&A.
For all of you who are interested to learn more about what we do at Wikistrat, some of the simulations that we're going to be running in the upcoming weeks and some of the reports that we're going to be issuing about this situation that is evolving, or if you want to learn a little bit about what we can do for you, for your organization, class, or company, please let us know. We'll be happy to provide you with information and to basically plan this with you.
Thank you so much, Keir. Thank you, everybody, who participated in this Q&A on this Saturday. And well, we should all go back to Twitter and see what happened in the last 30 minutes because this thing is evolving at the moment. So, thank you so much.