Tehran at Crossroads: Where Is Iran’s Nuclear Strategy Heading?

Iran’s nuclear program has reached a moment where every path carries risk. Advancing toward a weapon could ignite a larger war, stepping back from enrichment would look like capitulation, and holding the line preserves a status quo that is already eroding under sanctions, strikes, and regional setbacks. On November 26, Wikistrat hosted Iran expert Dr. Sina Azodi to examine why Tehran is stuck between these choices, how the leadership interprets pressure at home and abroad, and what the next phase of Iran’s nuclear strategy is likely to look like

Webinar Recording:

Dr. Sina Azodi is Director of the Middle East Studies program at George Washington University, specializing in U.S.-Iran relations, nuclear nonproliferation, and Iranian foreign policy. He is a frequent commentator in international media and the author of the forthcoming book Iran and the Bomb: The United States, Iran and the Nuclear Question (2026).

Key Insights

1. A three driver program: security, modernization, energy 

   Iran’s nuclear effort rests on the same pillars that guided the Shah: a security hedge, a symbol of technological progress, and a long term answer to energy demand. Depending on the moment, one motive dominates while the others recede, but all remain embedded in Iran’s strategic identity.

   
   

2. Regime survival and national memory reinforce each other 

   The leadership sees the bomb as protection against the fate of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, and as insurance after a century of invasions, occupation, and chemical attacks. That combination makes nuclear latency feel necessary rather than optional.

   
   

3. Threshold status is the preferred posture 

   Tehran does not want a weapon today and does not want to give up enrichment. Remaining at the threshold preserves deterrence, avoids the dangers of overt weaponization, and prevents the political humiliation of rolling back a decades long investment.

   
   

4. Enrichment has become a matter of pride 

   Years of sunk cost, legal arguments about “rights”, and domestic expectations have elevated enrichment from leverage to identity. Giving it up would damage internal legitimacy more than destroying facilities would harm technical capability.

   
   

5. Time is viewed as an ally, not an enemy 

   Iranian leaders think in decades rather than election cycles. Even after direct US and Israeli strikes, the system believes it can wait out pressure and hold its position until conditions shift in its favor.

   
   

6. Succession politics shadow every decision 

   Khamenei has signaled that only his death or resignation could allow a full rollback. The IRGC will be central in choosing his successor, and the next generation of commanders lacks the war trauma that made current leaders cautious, which could shift risk tolerance.

   
   

7. Two competing strategic camps: China versus North Korea 

   One faction wants controlled engagement with the West to stabilize the system. The other argues that confrontation is structural and sees weaponization as the only reliable shield. Khamenei balances the two to prevent either from dominating.

   
   

8. Regional rearmament tightens Iran’s threat perception 

   US guarantees for Qatar, a deepening US Saudi defense pact, and new advanced weapons for Gulf states sharpen Iran’s sense of encirclement. Under sanctions, Tehran cannot match this buildup and leans harder on missiles, drones, proxies, and nuclear latency.

   
   

9. Proxy strain increases pressure on the nuclear hedge 

   Setbacks in Syria, strain in Yemen, and Hezbollah’s weakened position narrow Iran’s peripheral tools. As these buffers erode, public and elite discussion of weaponization has become more visible on Iranian media.

   
   

10. Dismantling is not on the table, even with regime change 

    Dr. Azodi argues that the Shah and the Islamic Republic pursued the same nuclear goals for the same reasons. A post Islamic Republic Iran would still insist on enrichment, security hedging, and technological status as national imperatives, not ideological ones.

    
    

11. US constraints limit diplomatic space 

    Washington’s political culture has long treated Iran as an outlier. Any US administration that seeks negotiation faces strong domestic pushback, and Trump 2.0 sees little incentive to offer concessions to a weakened middle power.

    
    

12. Scenarios for 2026 reveal a narrow menu

    The most likely path is quiet reconstruction of the threshold and limited back channel engagement. The worst case is a renewed Israel Iran escalation triggered by a shift in Israeli red lines. The black swan, dismantling the program, remains the least plausible outcome.

    
    

Dr. Azodi’s upcoming book, Iran and the Bomb: The United States, Iran and the Nuclear Question (2026), offers a rare look at how Iranian leaders across eras have understood security, status, and nuclear capability. It draws extensively on Iranian sources to explain why the program has endured and why its core logic is unlikely to change.