Inside the Kremlin's Calculus: What's Really Driving Russia's War Strategy?

Putin isn't losing the war in Ukraine, at least, not in his own mind. He believes time is on his side, that Russia can outlast Ukrainian resistance, and that the West's resolve will crack before his does. But is this confidence justified, or the product of an authoritarian system that can no longer tell him the truth? On November 5, Wikistrat hosted Mark Galeotti to examine the Kremlin's actual objectives, the forces shaping Russian decision-making, whether Moscow's strategy is working, and what might force Putin to change course

Webinar Recording:

Mark Galeotti is the Director of the consultancy Mayak Intelligence and an Honorary Professor at the UCL School of Slavic & East European Studies. Known as one of the most informed voices on modern Russia, Mark is the host of the "In Moscow's Shadows" podcast and the author of a blog with the same name, where he shares analyses of Russian crime and security.

Key Insights

1. Putin’s pyramid: self, system, state

   Survival comes first for Putin, preservation of his patronage system comes second, and the interests of Russia come third. He holds objectives, yet lacks roadmaps, which produces opportunism rather than a coherent strategy.

   
   

2. A moving definition of “win”

   Victory is whatever is maximally attainable when a deal becomes necessary. Current asks include holding the remaining parts of Donetsk and Luhansk, blocking NATO membership for Ukraine, and capping Ukraine’s military to keep it vulnerable to pressure.

   
   

3. Time as a weapon

   The Kremlin believes it can outlast Kyiv and its backers. Costs at home are tolerated, talks can be used or dropped, and attrition is acceptable if it preserves a claim to success.

   
   

4. Elite discomfort without leverage

   Many technocrats recognize the growing costs but avoid challenging the Kremlin. Career risk, economic gain, and a measure of patriotism keep them compliant, unless a major shock, such as a contested succession or sustained mass protests, changes their calculus.

   
   

5. Two concurrent campaigns

   On the battlefield, Russia grinds forward where possible. In parallel, it wages a strategic strike campaign against energy and society, coordinating drones and missiles to stress air defenses and political will.

   
   

6. An economy that grinds on, resilience that thins

   Sanctions leakage, Chinese demand, and state management allow Russia to continue the war. Inflation, labor shortages, and high rates sap productivity, and the system’s capacity to absorb future shocks is the weak point.

   
   

7. Manpower and the mobilization lever

   Russia still draws volunteers through financial incentives, but mounting losses and labor shortages strain the system. A new mobilization remains possible, yet its political cost would directly link the war’s pace to domestic stability.

   
   

8. Nationalist pressure narrows options

   Ultranationalists are few but influential in security circles. Their criticism deters concessions and nudges Putin toward maximalist choices to avoid accusations of betrayal.

   
   

9. NATO as the real audience

   Moscow treats Ukraine as a proxy front with NATO, aims to fragment allied cohesion, and prefers sub-threshold operations that raise costs without triggering direct alliance retaliation.

   
   

10. Scenarios for the day after Putin

    - Best case: a pragmatic coalition figure freezes the conflict roughly in place, trades restraint for gradual relief, and tacitly lets frozen assets fund Ukraine’s rebuild. 

    - Worst case: a younger, sharper hardliner mobilizes early, prosecutes the war more efficiently, and pressures a fatigued Kyiv. 

    - Black swan: a contested succession forces Moscow inward, cohesion frays, and front-line morale cracks, creating sudden openings for Ukraine.