Is Taiwan the Next Ukraine? Scenarios for the Decade Ahead

Forget 2027, the real Taiwan crisis is already underway. In this NYU Riskathon-exclusive webinar, Dr. Minxin Pei argues that Beijing has little incentive to risk invasion when gray zone tactics are proving effective: military drills, pressure on undersea cables, and shipping disruptions that impose steady costs on Taipei without triggering US intervention. The flashpoint to watch is 2028, when elections on both sides of the Pacific collide with an increasingly assertive Chinese leadership

Dr. Minxin Pei is Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College and was the inaugural Library of Congress Chair on U.S.-China Relations. He directed the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His books include The Broken China Dream (2025) and The Sentinel State (2024). He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard and his analyses appear in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal.

Watch full recording:

Key Insights

1. Amphibious invasion remains theoretically possible but practically implausible in the near term

   Pei emphasized that geography still matters: a hundred miles of open water separate China from Taiwan, rendering any large-scale landing operation extraordinarily costly and complex. A genuine invasion would demand massive national mobilization, visible civil defense preparations, large-scale stockpiling, and a fundamental repositioning of Chinese financial assets, none of which are evident at the scale required for total war.

   
   

2. Hybrid warfare and gray zone tactics represent the primary risk channel

   Rather than betting on imminent invasion, Pei sees Beijing preparing for sustained coercion that falls short of formal warfare. This includes aerial and naval incursions, pressure on undersea cables, inspections of Taiwan-bound shipping, and exercises that drive up insurance premiums and operational uncertainty, all designed to make the status quo steadily more painful for Taipei without triggering immediate US military intervention.

   
   

3. The Davison "2027" narrative lacks visible empirical support

   Addressing the widely cited claim that China will be ready to attack Taiwan by 2027, Pei expressed skepticism. While acknowledging that US commanders may have access to superior intelligence, he stressed that a move toward full amphibious capability would be accompanied by unmistakable signs: substantial increases in amphibious assets, extensive new infrastructure, and comprehensive economic and financial preparations for confrontation with the United States, which external observers have not yet detected at the necessary scale.

   
   

4. The time horizon to watch is 2028, not 2027

   Pei identified January 2028 as the real political breakpoint. The next Taiwanese presidential election could deliver a more assertive, sovereignty-focused leadership that Beijing may interpret as the final warning before escalating pressure. Simultaneously, the US presidential cycle and leadership changes in regional states, including the Philippines presidential election, will converge, creating a more volatile alignment of domestic and external factors than what 2027 presents.

   
   

5. Nuclearization would constitute a hard red line for Beijing and a problem for Washington

   A hypothetical attempt by Taiwan to pursue nuclear weapons would be nearly impossible to conceal, given extensive Chinese intelligence penetration on the island. If Beijing obtained credible evidence of such a move, Pei anticipates an immediate quarantine or crisis similar in character to the Cuban Missile Crisis, emphasizing that such a step would alarm Washington almost as much as Beijing.

   
   

6. Information operations matter, but Taiwan is not Southeast Asia

   When asked about Chinese influence operations and platforms such as TikTok, Pei cautioned against overstating their effectiveness in Taiwan. He characterized Taiwanese society as highly educated and wary of Chinese Communist Party rule, which limits the impact of disinformation and psychological operations compared to environments where fear and distrust of Beijing are weaker.

   
   

7. Trump represents a short-term stabilizer, not a long-term solution

   In Pei's assessment, Xi Jinping has strong incentives to avoid a Taiwan crisis while relations with President Trump remain personally cordial and politically useful. A successful Trump visit to China in April and a reciprocal Xi visit to Washington later in the year would likely secure a period of relative calm that Beijing views as an opportunity to quietly strengthen deterrence. However, if a Trump visit were to fail, Pei expects Chinese leaders to feel less constrained and more willing to escalate gray zone pressure around Taiwan.

   
   

8. Regional actors are secondary but not irrelevant

   Japan and the Philippines feature prominently in Chinese military planning, since US defense of Taiwan is nearly impossible without access to Japanese bases, and because southern routes for blockade or invasion run near Philippine waters. South Korea, by contrast, is seen as less likely to join a Taiwan conflict in a meaningful military capacity, although it remains part of the broader strategic environment.