On the Brink of War: Iran, the US, and What Comes Next

Iran's Supreme Leader faces what may be the defining decision of his tenure: capitulate to American demands and risk looking weak enough to invite future attacks, or absorb a U.S. military strike and bet that the regime survives it. According to Dr. Raz Zimmt, Khamenei has already made his choice. On February 27, Wikistrat hosted a webinar with one of Israel's leading Iran experts, who laid out why a military strike is now more likely than an agreement, and what it could mean for the regime, the region, and the balance of power in the Middle East

Webinar Recording:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_WYbom7omvA

Dr. Raz Zimmt is Director of the Iran and Shiite Axis Research Program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and a Research Fellow at the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University.

Key Insights

1. A collision of incompatible worldviews is driving the crisis 

The US believes Iran is at its weakest point since 1979 and sees no rational reason for Tehran not to capitulate. Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei sees the same vulnerability but concludes that capitulation would only invite a strike anyway. Caught between two forms of strategic suicide, he is choosing to absorb the risk of military action rather than dismantle the assets he believes are the regime's last line of defense.

2. The nuclear gap is real, and the fissile material question is the hardest to bridge 

Three core nuclear issues remain unresolved: enrichment rights, the disposition of roughly 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, and the return of IAEA inspectors. Iran may accept inspectors back on limited terms. A creative formula on enrichment, where Washington acknowledges Iran's right in principle while Tehran suspends the practice, is not inconceivable. But Iran's flat refusal to ship its stockpile out of the country is the most likely dealbreaker.

3. A deal is possible but currently unlikely 

Both sides technically have an interest in avoiding war. Iran could frame limited nuclear concessions as a lifeline at a moment of maximum pressure; President Trump could frame a no-sunset, zero-enrichment-for-a-decade agreement as decisively superior to the JCPOA. But the current trajectory suggests neither side is yet willing to make the move that would allow the other to declare victory.

4. A US strike would be qualitatively different from the 12-day war 

The June Israeli campaign damaged but did not obliterate Iran's nuclear infrastructure. A US-led operation would likely go further, targeting reconstituted ballistic missile facilities with greater underground penetration capability, and potentially including direct strikes on IRGC command structures and senior political leadership, up to and including Khamenei himself.

5. Decapitation alone will not topple the regime, but it could create the conditions for change 

Even a successful strike on Iran's top leadership would not automatically produce regime collapse. That outcome requires participation from below. But if strikes degrade IRGC and Basij command capacity across the country, the post-war period could create openings for popular mobilization that the recent protest waves, brutally suppressed but never fully extinguished, have so far failed to achieve.

6. The IRGC fights for survival, not just ideology 

Mass defections from Iran's security forces have not materialized despite thousands of protesters killed. Dr. Zimmt's explanation is structural: IRGC members and Basij forces have too much to lose. Unlike Egypt's military, which survived multiple transitions, Iran's security services are too implicated in repression to expect amnesty from any successor government. Their loyalty is inseparable from their self-interest.

7. Khamenei is the bottleneck, and his survival or death changes everything 

As long as Khamenei is alive, internal reform or factional realignment is effectively frozen. His death, whether in a strike or from natural causes, would trigger a succession contest with no clear heir. The era of clerical rule under the concept of velayat-e faqih may be approaching its end, with a constitutional restructuring or a military-backed technocratic leadership among the more plausible post-Khamenei scenarios.

8. The opposition is structurally incapable of filling a power vacuum Decades of preemptive suppression have left Iran without an organized domestic opposition. The most realistic post-collapse scenario is not a democratic transition but a reshuffling within the existing elite: IRGC generals, technocrats, and reform-adjacent figures jockeying for position. External opposition figures and imprisoned dissidents could play a role only if a genuine transition period emerges.

9. Gulf states want de-escalation, but not at the cost of Israeli regional dominance 

The Arab Gulf states are alarmed by the prospect of an Iranian retaliatory strike on their territory and economic assets. But there is a secondary concern: if Iran is sufficiently weakened, Israel's regional influence grows unchecked, an outcome Gulf capitals are also reluctant to enable. Their pressure for restraint reflects genuine strategic ambiguity, not simple pro-Iranian sentiment.

10. Hezbollah is trapped 

Hezbollah's military capabilities are a fraction of their pre-2024 levels. Joining the war against Israel risks a devastating Israeli countercampaign; staying out while Iran is struck would accelerate the group's strategic marginalization. Either path is damaging. Iran's ability to financially sustain Hezbollah's reconstruction depends entirely on the Islamic Republic's survival, making Hezbollah's long-term future contingent on Tehran's.

11. Iran's aerial defenses remain severely degraded 

Dr. Zimmt's under-examined point: the surprises in this conflict are more likely to come from the US-Israeli side than from Iran. Tehran's air defense architecture was badly damaged in the 12-day war and has not been reconstituted. The asymmetry in strike capability is larger than most public assessments acknowledge.