Wikistrat’s Facebook followers recently engaged in a 24-hour exclusive Q&A session with one of Wikistrat’s Experts, William Hagestad II. Questions and Hagestad’s answers are transcribed below.

Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) William Hagestad II is an internationally-recognized cyber intelligence and counterintelligence professional who specializes in cultural, historical, linguistic and technical analysis of national cyber warfare capabilities, intents and methodologies. He advises intelligence organizations, military flag officers and multinational companies about internal IT security governance and external security policies.

His military experience spans over 27 years; enlisting in the United States Marine Corps in 1981 and having served in numerous command posts. In 2002-2003, he was the Anti-Terrorism Officer for Marine Central Command during the initial build-up and subsequent operations in Iraq. Between 2006 and 2007, he served with II Marine Expeditionary Force and the United States Army’s 1st Armored Division in Ramadi, Iraq.

He is the author of 21st Century Chinese Cyberwarfare (2012), Operation Middle Kingdom: China’s Use of Computers & Networks as a Weapon System (2013) and Chinese Information Warfare Doctrine Development 1994-2014 (2014).

Yoni Dayan Could you explain us what are the key differences (in doctrine, methods, etc.) between the information operations and warfare from China and the United States?

Answer: The main differences in cyber doctrine development between China and the United States is one of defining the adversary. From the US Defence Industrial Base (DIB) the enemy is China, and as U.S. history aptly dictates they must prepare for war. The notion that no foreign military has ever occupied the U.S. is a paramount driver which motivates this thinking and the binary avenue of approach for an adversary dictates both a defensive and offensive information warfare capability to prevent the possibility of foreign invasion.

Conversely the Chinese view information warfare doctrine development historically as well. They, in contrast to the U.S., have been invaded throughout history from a physical perspective. Thus the Chinese, as a culture, are unwilling to be taken advantage of in the binary world as they have been physically invaded. In this case, in response to the U.S. creation of a military component command for cyberspace, Cyber Command, in 2010, then-President Hu Jintao ordered his top People’s Liberation Army generals to create a cohesive energy-efficient network war mobilization command system (the Chinese version of Cyber Command) with the expressed mission of “protecting China’s infrastructure against foreign threats in cyber space.” (more…)

Wikistrat’s Facebook followers recently engaged in a 24-hour exclusive Q&A session with one of Wikistrat’s Senior Analysts, Ernesto Sanchez. Questions and Sanchez’ answers are transcribed below.

Ernesto J. Sanchez is an Miami-based attorney who focuses his practice on international dispute resolution and related appellate work. He is the author of The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Deskbook, which examines U.S. legal actions against foreign governments, including terrorism litigation. Mr. Sanchez’s other publications on international security issues include articles for The National Interest, the Brookings Institution’s Lawfare blog and the World Policy Institute.

Jesse Parent: What are your thoughts on legal actions by foreign governments (or the ICC) against the United States? Do you foresee any room for actual prosecution along the lines of treatment of prisoners or fabrication of evidence leading to the Iraq War? Or do you see such concerns as ultimately untenable, if not trivial?

Answer: As far as international tribunals are concerned, there are, in practice, two classes of states: the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and all other countries. The five permanent members can block enforcement of judgments by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or criminal prosecutions in the International Criminal Court (ICC). That means the U.S. would almost certainly (99.99% chance) use this veto power if faced with legal actions in either forum.

As for national courts, under the principle of foreign state immunity, states bar civil actions against foreign states and their officials without their consent. Some states allow for exceptions in such cases as commercial activities. But I know of no country with a “human rights exception” to which, say, an innocent person extraordinarily rendered by the CIA could resort.

A Spanish court once considered allowing the criminal prosecution of certain George W. Bush Administration officials under principles of universal jurisdiction (i.e., authority to prosecute “crimes against all people” regardless of connection to a specific state). Diplomatic considerations stopped the investigation, as they have prevented Italy from requesting the extradition of CIA officers convicted and sentenced to prison in absentia for an extraordinary rendition to Egypt taking place in Milan. However, I understand that these individuals have been advised to not travel abroad, even though it may seem unfair to have ordinary government functionaries prosecuted abroad for implementing policies set forth by high-ranking policymakers. (more…)