The US-Iran Deal: What’s Next

A war launched to dismantle Iran's nuclear program has paused with Iran's enriched uranium stockpile intact, its grip on the Strait of Hormuz tighter than before, and a ceasefire document that has already triggered calls for Araqchi's head in Tehran and accusations of capitulation in Washington. On June 17, Wikistrat invited Dr. Sina Azodi, one of the leading voices on U.S.-Iran relations, to assess what the MOU actually establishes, whether Iran will go nuclear, and why Iran emerges from the war more confident than before

Webinar Recording:

Dr. Sina Azodi is the Director of the Middle East Studies program at George Washington University, specializing in U.S.-Iran relations, nuclear nonproliferation, and Iranian foreign policy. He is a frequent commentator in international media and the author of the book Iran and the Bomb: The United States, Iran and the Nuclear Question (2026), which traces the evolution of Iran’s nuclear strategy in the context of its fraught relationship with Washington.

Key Insights

1. The MOU is deliberately vague 

Both sides tried keeping the agreement secret to protect it from internal and external spoilers. In Tehran, factions opposed to any engagement with Washington have always existed; when the JCPOA was signed in 2015, Foreign Minister Zarif received death threats from members of parliament. The pattern is repeating: In Tehran, protesters chant "Death to Araghchi" against the foreign minister and "Death to Ghalibaf" against the parliament speaker now serving as chief nuclear negotiator. In Washington, Democratic senators accuse President Trump of capitulating to Iran, the same charge Republicans leveled at the JCPOA in 2015.

2. One and a half pages cannot resolve what 158 pages left unfinished 

The JCPOA ran to 158 pages of technical specifications. This MOU is a political framework that opens the path to nuclear negotiations; it cannot substitute for them. The critical details, including enrichment levels and the fate of Iran's 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium at 60%, still have to be hammered out in the 60-day window.

3. Any final deal will look more like the JCPOA than Trump would like 

The architecture of any durable nuclear agreement is fixed: sanctions relief in exchange for nuclear restraint, transparency, and intrusive IAEA inspection. That was the foundation of the JCPOA. President Trump dislikes the label, but the substance of what he's negotiating toward is recognizably similar.

4. The new leadership in Tehran is security-minded, not ideological, and that changes the nuclear calculus 

The generals now running Iran, including Ghalibaf, a former IRGC commander, and General Vahidi at the Security Council, were shaped by the Iran-Iraq War. They watched Iran get attacked twice in under a year without nuclear weapons. A crude gun-type device is technically within reach. Azodi still believes Iran will not cross the nuclear finish line, but the logic pulling toward it is stronger than it was before the war.

5. Iran now knows what the Strait of Hormuz is worth 

For years, closure of the Strait was a threat. Now Tehran has seen it executed. Fertilizer prices spiked in North Africa, gas prices moved in Asia, and global markets reacted. Iran demonstrated it can hold world energy markets hostage whenever it chooses, and that knowledge does not disappear after the MOU is signed.

6. The reconstruction fund question is unsettled and being misread 

The $300 billion reconstruction figure circulating in reports has not been confirmed by either side, and President Trump has said it doesn't exist. What is more concrete is Iran's push to access its own frozen assets, held in foreign banks that refuse to transact with Tehran under threat of U.S. sanctions penalties. Repatriating those funds to the Iranian central bank is the more immediate and verifiable economic commitment in the MOU.

7. Iran won the war by surviving it 

Tehran's confidence has increased. The country attacked Diego Garcia, destroyed an American AWACS, downed five refueling tankers, and attacked the vicinity of the Dimona nuclear power plant in Israel. From Tehran's perspective, not losing to the United States is a victory, and the regime is acting accordingly. Its regional ambitions never disappeared; they were always a function of capability, willingness, and confidence, and the war raised the last of those. 

8. The Islamic Republic is shifting from revolutionary to nationalist framing 

Since the June 2025 war, statues of pre-Islamic Persian rulers have gone up in Tehran squares. Mythical Persian figures are appearing in the streets. The regime is rehabilitating Iran's imperial past as a tool of social cohesion.

9. Social restrictions are loosening while political repression is on the rise 

The Islamic Republic is executing people on espionage charges linked to Israel and the United States at a higher rate than before the war. At the same time, women in downtown Tehran are not covering, and restaurants are allowing patrons to bring their own alcohol. By relaxing social restrictions, including enforcement of mandatory hijab, they ease pressure on the population. This reflects a regime managing survival through selective control.

10. Reza Pahlavi's window has closed 

The Pahlavi movement had its moment in January. When American strikes killed 160 schoolchildren at the Minab school, Pahlavi refused to condemn it or express solidarity with the families. His supporters' rhetoric, including promises to resurrect SAVAK, the Shah's notorious secret police, has pushed away many Iranians who might otherwise have backed him. He is now widely seen inside Iran as a foreign-backed figure without the spine to lead.

11. Mojtaba Khamenei's succession transformed the Islamic Republic into a dynasty 

The father-to-son transfer broke the republic's own founding logic. Mojtaba remains largely invisible, with the IRGC citing security concerns to explain why he cannot be seen or heard. In the short term, the IRGC will expand its authority while Mojtaba finds his footing. Over time, Azodi expects him to follow the pattern of every Iranian leader who consolidates power by marginalizing the commanders who helped him get there.

12. The Kurdish threat registers at two out of ten 

Plans reportedly circulated in Washington for Kurdish militia operations out of northern Iraq. Iran preemptively struck those positions with artillery, air, and ballistic missiles. The deeper reason the threat is limited: Kurds inside Iran identify as Iranian first and Kurdish second, a pattern unique to Iran in the region.

13. This is the end of the beginning, not the beginning of the end 

Forty-seven years of animosity cannot be resolved in a page and a half. But if both sides implement what they've signed, it shows that more agreements are possible. Azodi has spent his career working toward a U.S.-Iran rapprochement and believes the path from Tehran to Washington still passes through Jerusalem: without setting aside the anti-Israel rhetoric, Iran cannot fundamentally normalize its relationship with the United States.